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ABSTRACT 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and into the 21st Century, the United States (U.S.) 
has continued to maintain global commitments and a global presence.  In addition, the 
U.S. has expanded its aspirations to address a more diverse range of global security 
challenges than in previous periods; from conventional conflicts to climate change.  In 
order to meet the demands of a 21st century superpower, the U.S. Department of Defense 
is expected to conduct a broad range of operations across a spectrum of threats.  Indeed, 
U.S. technological superiority is a hallmark of U.S. military prowess and has been 
instrumental in supporting Department of Defense functions.  While the U.S. is currently 
considered to have the most technologically advanced military in the world, the U.S. 
technological advantage is dwindling.  In response to the unpredictable security 
environment and the dwindling U.S. technological edge, the U.S. Department of Defense 
is pursuing a new strategy to offset future threats and maintain U.S. technological 
superiority known as the “third offset” strategy.  The third offset strategy consists of three 
major thrusts: to develop cutting-edge technologies, to explore new operational concepts 
utilizing cutting-edge technologies, and to acquire and retain the best and brightest 
workforce to achieve the other two goals.  Although still in its inchoate stages, it is yet to 
be seen if the strategy will come to fruition and achieve the intended results. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The current global security environment is often characterized as uncertain and 
unpredictable.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has expanded its role in 
addressing a diverse range of global security challenges.  The U.S. is determined to 
combat traditional security issues such as, conventional armed conflicts, and confront 
new challenges like, the effects of climate change and guaranteeing U.S. energy security.  
In order to meet these demands, the U.S. Department of Defense continues to conduct a 
broad range of operations, across a spectrum of threats.  Not only has the U.S. increased 
the scope of its security missions, U.S. global commitments and partnerships remain 
numerous with approximately 450,000 personnel deployed overseas and on U.S. vessels, 
around the globe.1 
Indeed, successfully managing U.S. commitments, as well as, addressing global 
security challenges, is a formidable task.  Moreover, the U.S. role as a global security 
provider cannot be assumed to continue in an unpredictable future.  To date, U.S. 
technological superiority has been instrumental in facilitating the U.S. to meet its 
commitments and address the ever increasing security challenges.  The U.S. military is 
the most technologically savvy, efficient, and effective military in the world.  However, 
the U.S. technological advantage is dwindling, and the U.S. freedom to navigate the 
globe and intervene is being threatened.2  Near peers, like Russia and China, are 
                                                 
1. “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, January 
27, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/About, paragraph 6. 
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 
2015, 3, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_ 
Strategy.pdf. 
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countering and copying U.S. technologies like precision munitions, surveillance 
platforms, and command and control networks, in an effort to close the technological 
gap.3  Additionally, features of the future security environment such as demographic 
shifts, the diffusion of technology through globalization, new centers of power, and 
unique strategies to upset the traditional power structure, could undermine U.S. influence, 
power projections, and commitments.4 
Globalization has created an environment where technologies that were once 
reserved for major powers, with defense infrastructures, have proliferated and have 
become easier for state and non-state actors to access and develop.5  For example, 
autonomous aircraft, like drones, were once an exclusive capability of major states.  
Now, drones have become smaller, more versatile, inexpensive, and commonplace.  This 
reality is illustrated by a quick internet search; drones are available to private citizens and 
enthusiasts through the internet and retail stores, some costing less than US$100.6  
Recreational drones utilize similar technology to their military counterparts and could 
easily be converted to suit a terrorist organization’s, a criminal network’s, or a state 
actor’s needs without having to develop a robust manufacturing infrastructure.  This 
reality highlights the dual use nature of emerging technologies; many have military and 
civilian uses and can easily be converted to suit any actor’s objective. 
                                                 
3. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 4, http://archive. 
defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 1. 
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 7. 
6. A Google.com search of “drone” resulted in information pertaining to the purchase 
of recreational drones and a link to BestBuy.com, where one can find a drone for under 
US$100. 
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This example not only highlights how ubiquitous the systems have become, but 
also the pivotal role private industry is beginning to play in producing cutting-edge 
technologies.  Current technological advancements are occurring within the private sector 
for commercial uses and are considered to be outpacing the technological development 
occurring within the Federal government.7  This is in contrast to the historic flow of 
technology which was restricted to major defense contractors and the government which 
then spread to the private sector for commercial exploitation.8  Radar, global positioning 
systems, and the Internet are examples of government initiated technologies that became 
widespread for civilian consumption.  The inverted nature of the current technology flow 
means the government must seek outside technologies for its own use and applications.9  
The military modernization efforts by U.S. adversaries, the diffusion of technology due to 
globalization, and the inverted nature of technological development are viewed by U.S. 
leaders as contributing to the dwindling U.S. technological advantage. 
In response to the unpredictable security environment and the dwindling U.S. 
technological edge, the Pentagon recently released plans for a new “offset” strategy; 
commonly referred to as the “third offset”.  The third offset strategy was introduced in 
2014 as part of a larger U.S. Department of Defense initiative.  Laid out in the keynote 
address before the Reagan National Defense Forum, former Secretary of Defense Hagel 
announced the Defense Innovation Initiative.  The foremost goal of this initiative is to 
                                                 
7. National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National 
Security, A 21st Century Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for America’s 
National Security, (2016), 5, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
microsites/ostp/NSTC/national_s ecurity_s_and_t_strategy.pdf. 
8. Ibid., 5. 
9. Ibid., 1. 
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terminate the loss of the U.S. technological advantage to ensure the U.S. maintains a 
robust and effective conventional deterrence.10  This extensive initiative is aimed with: 
1) Developing cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics, 
autonomous systems, miniaturization, analyzing big data, and advanced 
manufacturing, like 3-D printing. 
2) Exploring new operational concepts and approaches to warfighting by 
utilizing the cutting-edge technologies developed. 
3) Acquiring and retaining the best and brightest minds to pursue the previous 
objectives.11 
In short, technical innovation, coupled with the development of operational concepts and 
doctrine, will comprise the third offset strategy. 
An offset strategy is not novel.   In fact, the U.S. has pursued an offset strategy on 
two previous occasions since the end of World War II and the advent of the nuclear age.  
The Pentagon defines the first offset as President Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy 
which offset Soviet conventional strength by bolstering U.S. nuclear forces.12  The 
ultimate objective of the New Look was to deter Soviet aggression and increase security 
“on the cheap” by investing in unconventional forces, which were considered less 
expensive to field than conventional forces.13  
As defined by the Pentagon, the second offset strategy began in the 1970s when 
Pentagon leaders established the Long Range Research and Development Planning 
Program (LRRDPP) that “helped develop and field revolutionary new systems such as 
extended-range precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, and new intelligence, 
                                                 
10. Chuck Hagel, “Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote Address”, United States 
Department of Defense, November 15, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/ 
Speech-View/Article/606635. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Patrick Garrity, “A New Look at the New Look”, Claremont Institute, December 
14, 2012, http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/a-new-look-at-the-new-look/. 
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surveillance and reconnaissance platforms”.14  The second offset period continued 
through the 1980s with the investment and fielding of those technologies.  The Pentagon 
definition of the second offset is vague.  While these technologies are important in the 
U.S. military enterprise today, this definition fails to include doctrinal transformations 
and training reforms that occurred alongside the advent of new technologies. 
The first two offsets will be explained in greater detail in the following sections.  
Also, it is important to note that these are Department of Defense delineations of offset 
periods and not the author’s.  It is accepted that others may have differing opinions as to 
what constitutes an “offset” period in U.S. strategy.  However, to limit the scope of 
research, the Department of Defense periods are utilized since this is the organization 
pursuing an offset strategy for the third time.  The author’s explanation of historical 
events and influencing factors are meant to add context to the Pentagon definitions of the 
offset periods.  In addition, a thorough research of each offset is helpful as it provides 
historical lessons and a lens through which to examine the third offset. 
In addition, since the prime topic of this discussion pertains to offset strategies, it 
is important to define an “offset strategy” for the purposes of this document.  
Fundamentally, an offset strategy seeks to counterbalance an adversary’s strength with a 
technology, weapon, platform, and/or policy that serve as force multipliers thus 
undermining the adversary’s strengths while enhancing one’s ability to deter or fight a 
numerically superior enemy.  In short, it is a strategy of quality and effectiveness over 
quantity of capabilities; the objective is to not field troop for troop or tank for tank.  A 
portion of this definition, namely in regards to a numerically superior enemy, may not 
                                                 
14. Hagel, “Keynote Address”. 
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seem as applicable today as it was during the Cold War.  However, taking into account 
the number of contingencies and operations the U.S. may become involved in, coupled 
with the broad spectrum of threats, have produced, in sum, a multiplicity of adversaries 
and challenges that can be considered numerically superior. 
Another useful topic to discuss before moving forward is the descriptive words 
that accompany the word technology throughout the document.  Current generation 
technology, current technology, or off-the-shelf technology are those technologies that 
have been well developed for years, like computers.  While advances are occurring in 
computer science and technology, that are enhancing computers, the machine itself is a 
current generation technology.  Over the horizon or advanced technology are 
technologies that will become mainstream in the short term, three to five years.  These 
types of technologies have not been developed to their full potential, are untried but have 
been under development long enough that their incorporation does not entail a great deal 
of risk.15  Leap-ahead technologies are technologies that skip a generation of over the 
horizon technology.  Leap-ahead technologies may take ten years to field but could offer 
greater benefit in the 15-20 year range.16  Having delineated those terms, the discussion is 
left with the term cutting-edge technology from the third offset objectives.  This term is 
equivocal.  It seems that the term cutting-edge technology is used by the Pentagon to 
signify, emerging technologies to leap-ahead technologies, or any technology for that 
matter, that has the greatest potential for military utility. 
                                                 
15. Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target:  The Transformation of American Military 
Policy (New York, NY:  Encounter Books, 2006), 71. 
16. Richard Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs:  New Methods for a 
New Era (Washington, DC:  National Defense University Press, 2006), 307, https://www. 
hsdl.org/?view&did=481962. 
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While the offset strategies share a common concept and name, they are indeed 
different from one another.  The first two offsets were formulated to confront a 
contemporary enemy or threat; the Soviet Union.  The third offset is targeted to confront 
future challenges and guarantee U.S. technological and military superiority.  In 
explanation, this offset is intended to address state and non-state actors, as well as, ensure 
the U.S. has the freedom to conduct any operation, across the spectrum of threats, 
anywhere in the world.  By pursuing an offset strategy at present, the U.S. expects to 
maintain its technological advantage ahead of any potential adversarial gains. 
One can already begin to see problems with such a lofty strategy.  Moreover, the 
obstacles to implementation are numerous.  Obvious obstacles include funding, due to 
sequestration, and leadership changes, highlighted by the election of a new administration 
to the White House.  Another obstacle includes a defense enterprise that is resistant to 
change.  Even if the Department of Defense were to embrace change, the bureaucracy 
tends to stymie innovation.  The current bureaucracy precludes quick research, 
development, testing, and fielding.  A speedier process will be necessary for the future 
due to the fast pace associated with technological development. 
Regardless of one’s opinion concerning the necessity of the third offset, the 
strategy encourages a higher level of discussion.  That is, can the U.S. continue to rely on 
technology to maintain its military superiority?  Additionally, has the U.S. placed too 
much importance on technology?  Technology has been a major driver in U.S. security 
since the beginning of the Cold War and a reversal would be a major change.  Further, 
there is much to debate as to whether the advent of new technologies are positive 
developments.  Also, if the diffusion of technology continues at the rate it is occurring 
 8 
now, could the development of technologies, that will inevitably become widespread, 
eventually bankrupt the state that develops technology?  With that said, how long does 
the U.S. expect this strategy to last?  While the second offset granted the U.S. a 
technological advantage for several decades, the U.S. advantage from the New Look was 
brief.  
The aforementioned issues raise a fundamental question; is this a judicious 
strategy to pursue at this time?  The strategy is intended to compete in a future security 
environment that is admittedly unpredictable, and that, in it of itself, seems like a glaring 
issue.  Also, has the diffusion of technology and military modernization efforts by U.S. 
adversaries created an environment where the U.S. technological superiority has 
“dwindled”?  In addition, one could argue that defense officials are hyping the future 
threat to secure funding in austere times.  With such a broad threat spectrum, can an 
adequate strategy be developed?  A valid view is that if the U.S. prepares for an unlimited 
number of contingencies, it is not adequately preparing for any one contingency. 
Additional considerations include: have the consequences on the future force been 
adequately examined?  How will units be structured?  What will the future force look like 
if it adopts the changes proposed in the third offset?  The integration of more technology 
into the military enterprise has serious ramifications.  Not only are robots expected to 
replace human jobs in the private sector, but one can almost guarantee this will occur in 
the military as well.  How will this situation impact individuals who pursue the military 
as an option after high school or as a career?  Will the U.S. military transform into an 
elite cadre of tech soldiers that are removed from society?  New technologies have 
 9 
ramifications for more than force structure.  The rules and conduct of war may also 
undergo changes as new technologies become commonplace. 
Indeed, the third offset is still in its inchoate stages and numerous questions 
abound concerning the strategy and its possible consequences.  Military improvements 
are not without their growing pains.  Obstacles and possible consequences need to be 
examined before the strategy is implemented to mitigate obstacles and address negative 
consequences.  Fortunately, the first two offsets provide some key lessons for the third 
offset; some to be followed and some to be avoided.  The third offset and its 
ramifications should be scrutinized, not for damaging purposes, but for constructive 
reasons, to benefit the U.S. defense enterprise. 
 10 
THE FIRST OFFSET 
 
Introduction to the New Look 
The U.S. pursuit of an offset strategy is not novel.  In fact, the U.S. has 
implemented offset strategies twice since the 1950s.  The first U.S. offset strategy 
termed, the “New Look”, was introduced in the 1950s by the Eisenhower administration.  
The New Look strategy strove to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional strength and 
reduce the U.S. defense budget by relying on a solid U.S. nuclear arsenal to deter Soviet 
aggression, and if needed, defeat Soviet aggression.17  In essence, the New Look sought 
to transform the U.S. military into a nuclear fighting force with an emphasis on the 
strategic deterrent deliverable by airpower.18 
U.S. reliance on its nuclear arsenal to deter Soviet aggression lead to the 
declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation; the overwhelming use of nuclear forces in the 
event of Soviet aggression.  It is important to note that this declaratory policy was not 
solely intended for retaliation but was intended to deter Soviet aggression, in Europe, 
where the U.S. and NATO forces were at a precarious conventional disadvantage.  
Conventional parity with the Soviet Union would have been a monumental task.  
                                                 
17. Elliot Converse, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense: Rearming 
for the Cold War, 1945-1960 Vol. 1, (Washington, DC:  Historical Office; Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2012), 393,  http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/ 
acquisition_pub/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-103257-540. 
18. Richard Leighton, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy, 
Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956 Vol. 3, ed. Alfred Goldberg, (Washington, DC:  
Historical Office; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010), v, http://history.defense.gov/ 
Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol3.pdf. 
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Moreover, both the U.S. and NATO were unwilling to spend the resources needed to 
create conventional parity.   
The New Look was heavily influenced by historical events, as well as, the 
personal beliefs of President Eisenhower and his administration.  As with any grand 
strategy, the implementation occurred and the consequences surfaced, over time.  This 
section will first explore those driving forces such as historical events, developing 
technologies, and personal beliefs that influenced the administration to pursue sweeping 
changes to the U.S. force.  Secondly, this section will outline the execution, as well as, 
detail the aftermath of the New Look on land, air, and sea assets of the services.  Finally, 
this section will discuss and examine key takeaways from the New Look that can be 
applied when analyzing the third offset. 
 
A Strong Economy, Armistice, and New Technology  
While few individuals may be familiar with the New Look, many are aware of the 
policy begotten from the New Look known as Massive Retaliation.  Certainly, 
Eisenhower’s declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation was a direct result of, and was 
considered a viable course of action by the Eisenhower administration because of the 
New Look.  Surprisingly, the grand strategy and philosophy that produced Massive 
Retaliation are often overlooked.  However, the New Look was a practical and principled 
strategy that was tailored to address threats within the limits of the Eisenhower 
administration’s outlook.  Interestingly, one of the greatest factors that influenced the 
New Look was Eisenhower’s personal beliefs about defense spending and national 
 12 
power.  Truly, these views steered the administration to develop a strategy like the New 
Look. 
When President Eisenhower took office, he was determined to reduce U.S. 
defense spending when compared to the Truman Era.19  President Truman had overseen a 
period of continued high defense expenditures, even after World War II, as a 
consequence of the foray on the Korean Peninsula.  Eisenhower was determined to 
reduce defense spending because he held strong views that prodigal defense spending 
would have detrimental effects on the U.S. economy, which in turn, could ultimately 
destroy the American way of life.20  Eisenhower rationalized his leeriness of excessive 
defense spending with cogent cause and effects on how profligate spending would alter 
the foundations of American Society. 
Eisenhower’s arguments followed the reasoning that defense spending would 
create the establishment of a large defense-industrial complex which would be 
underwritten by the U.S. government and influenced by special interests.  In 
Eisenhower’s view, special interests would lobby for and encourage higher defense 
spending, creating larger deficits and increased inflation.21  In turn, larger deficits and 
increased inflation would have negative impacts on the overall U.S. economy.  Further, in 
Eisenhower’s view, an economy where the defense sector made up a large portion of the 
economy, when compared to other market sectors, was weaker than a more diversified 
economy.22  Consequently, Eisenhower believed a weak U.S. economy would alter 
                                                 
19. Leighton, New Look, ii. 
20. Garrity, “A New Look”. 
21. Converse, Histroy of Acquistion, 393. 
22. Ibid. 
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American Society with the introduction and implementation of governmental controls to 
reinforce the economy.23  Ultimately, the introduction of economic controls and 
government oversights would not only limit economic freedoms, but would serve as a 
means to limit other freedoms, and thus threaten the American way of life. 
In addition to the aforementioned arguments against excessive defense 
expenditures based on values, Eisenhower had pragmatic reasons to oppose such 
spending.  He simply believed that high defense spending during peacetime was 
inefficient and wasteful.24  He reasoned that defense spending, which prepared for 
endless contingencies, would spiral out of control and create the problems mentioned 
above.  His views concerning defense spending may seem counterintuitive considering he 
was a career military general who had commanded the Allies to victory in Europe during 
World War II.  Nonetheless, the quote below demonstrates Eisenhower’s personal 
convictions. 
 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired 
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, 
those who are cold and are not clothed.  This world in arms is not 
spending money alone.  It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius 
of its scientists, the hopes of its children...25 
 
This excerpt demonstrates Eisenhower’s awareness of the direct and indirect 
consequences of excessive defense spending.  Although some may question the 
genuineness of his statement because he used laborers and scientists to make nuclear 
                                                 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid., 392. 
25. “Quotable Quotes of Dwight D. Eisenhower”, Eisenhower National Historic Site, 
accessed January 21, 2016, https://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/quotes2.htm, 
paragraph 6. 
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weapons, this misses the point.  The administration contrived the New Look to address 
two important issues.  On the one hand, the New look was intended to confront the Soviet 
threat and on the other hand, the New Look was calculated to reign in defense spending.  
Reigning in defense spending was an important issue to the Eisenhower administration 
because the administration believed excessive spending could threaten the American way 
of life.  In the end, if the American way of life was transformed by the slow erosion of 
freedoms it was no better than the ideology it was seeking to contain. 
While the above views were the prevailing philosophy of the Eisenhower 
administration, any solution to reducing defense spending would need to address the high 
costs associated with manpower spending.  The Eisenhower administration believed it 
could overcome this obstacle by increasing U.S. reliance on the strategic nuclear arsenal 
for security.  By relying on nuclear weapons, costly manpower dollars could be saved and 
security could be achieved.26  Therefore, an investment in nuclear forces would achieve 
“maximum protection at a bearable cost”.27  Nuclear weapons were viewed by the 
Eisenhower administration as a practical solution to its fiscal constraints. 
In addition to fabricating a strategy that fit within Eisenhower’s fiscal limits, the 
New Look was developed to confront Communism and the Soviet threat.  Not only did 
Eisenhower view a weakened economy negatively from the standpoint of altering the 
American way of life, but he also saw it as inimical to American foreign policy.  To 
Eisenhower, a nation’s economic strength was the basis for a strong foreign policy and a 
                                                 
26. Converse, History of Acquistion, 393. 
27. John Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy”, The Department of State Bulletin 
XXX, no. 761, (January 25, 1954) : 107-110. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=msu. 
31293008121345;view=1up;seq=110. 
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nation’s military strength was but one instrument of state power.28  Also, Eisenhower 
believed that a strong economy was the driving force that made a well-equipped force 
possible.29 
Resistance to the spread of Communism was a perennial issue during the Cold 
War and many are familiar with the aptly named Containment Doctrine that was a 
hallmark of U.S. strategy during this period.  The Containment Doctrine was introduced 
in 1946 by the Truman administration following World War II and the U.S. elevation to 
superpower status.  A review of the Containment philosophy was ordered at the 
beginning of the Eisenhower administration.  In what is referred to as Operation 
Solarium, three working groups were created to assess containment and offer fresh 
perspectives to restrain Communism.30  While the three working groups each presented 
separate recommendations, the proposal selected by President Eisenhower was a 
continuation of Containment with some changes.  A significant change to Containment 
was to characterize the ideological and power competition between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union as a long-term struggle.31  Identifying the ideological struggle between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union as long-term meant the U.S. had to pursue a strategy that 
balanced the protracted nature of the struggle against fiscal constraints.  Therefore, it was 
prudent to invest in cost-effective platforms with a prolonged deterrent value. 
                                                 
28. Leighton, New Look, 1. 
29. Converse, History of Acquistion, 393. 
30. Tyler Nottberg, “Once and Future Policy Planning:  Solarium for Today,” 
Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www. 
eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot, paragraph 8. 
31. Leighton, New Look, 150. 
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Another outcome of Operation Solarium was that the U.S. changed to a slightly 
more aggressive stance in its approach to undermining Soviet influence.  This more 
aggressive stance included the use of operations short of general war, like covert action, 
sabotage, and physiological operations to undermine Soviet strength and influence.32  The 
objective was to confront the Soviet threat and undermine Soviet influence at lower 
levels on the conflict spectrum with the hopeful outcome being that these actions would 
not lead to escalation.  Also, it was held that escalation could be avoided with a strong 
strategic arsenal that had a formidable deterrent value and an equally convincing 
declaratory message.  The struggle to contain communism was important for Eisenhower 
because he viewed power and influence in zero-sum terms.  To Eisenhower, losing 
influence over one nation, even on the periphery, would erode U.S. influence in other 
nations.33 
While Eisenhower’s personal beliefs helped shape the New Look, it was historical 
events and emerging technologies, like advancements in nuclear weapon technology, that 
allowed the administration to pursue sweeping changes.  However, a reduction in defense 
spending to allow a nuclear build up would have been impossible without the cessation of 
hostiles on the Korean Peninsula. 
Eisenhower came into office in January of 1953 and an armistice was signed that 
ended hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in July of the same year.  While the peace 
process had begun before he took office, the end of hostilities was not a foregone 
conclusion during the first six months of his presidency.  After his election, the peace 
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talks began to falter.  Eisenhower authorized an expanded bombing campaign and the 
National Security Council discussed the tactical and strategic employment of atomic 
weapons to end the conflict.34  It is unclear if expanded bombing and the hinted use of 
atomic weapons weighed heavily on the parties’ decision to reenter negotiations and 
ultimately accept a ceasefire agreement.  Moreover, it is difficult to determine the resolve 
of the U.S. to employ unconventional weapons to end the conflict.  Although, the threat 
to use unconventional weapons may serve as the harbinger for John Foster Dulles’s 
January 1954 speech that introduced the declaratory policy of Massive Retaliation. 
With the armistice in place, the administration was afforded the opportunity to 
offer a cost reduction for its first budget proposal in 1954.35  Without an ongoing conflict, 
easy savings would come from manpower cuts.  In addition, with Eisenhower’s 
Containment doctrine, that included efforts to undermine the Soviet Union with low 
intensity operations, there was no need to fund a large conventional strength after 
hostilities ended.  However, reducing the budget by cutting manpower would not 
automatically mean all manpower dollars could be saved.  The development and fielding 
of a nuclear strategic deterrent would also cost American taxpayers.  In the end, while 
Eisenhower was able to reduce defense expenditures when compared to the Truman Era, 
he was not able to reduce spending to his desired amount.36 
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Finally, an often overlooked factor that allowed the Eisenhower administration to 
pursue the New Look was emerging technologies and scientific advancements.  One 
reason Eisenhower had so much faith in the New Look stemmed from his belief that the 
U.S. would maintain technological superiority in the nuclear realm.37  In 1952 the U.S. 
ushered in the nuclear age with development and corresponding test of a thermonuclear 
weapon that had a blast yield of 10 megatons of TNT.38  For perspective, the atomic 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a blast yield of 15 and 20 kilotons of 
TNT, respectively.39  Not only were thermonuclear weapons more powerful than the 
previous generation of atomic weapons, thermonuclear warheads were smaller and lighter 
than their atomic counterparts, without compromising destructive power.  Additionally, 
because of miniaturization, nuclear warheads could be attached to missiles; ushering in 
the nuclear missile age. 
Simultaneous to the advent of the thermonuclear weapons and missiles, new 
technologies like the jet engine introduced new airframe platforms for delivery.40  A 
major component of the New Look was that the U.S. arsenal would be deliverable by air 
assets.  Further, transmitters and homing devices were also being miniaturized which 
greatly improved accuracy.  Improved accuracy, coupled with the ability to produce 
weapons with lower yields, meant that nuclear weapons could be employed in tactical 
situations.41  Indeed, there were significant scientific advancements in nuclear weapon 
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and associated technology, during the New Look period.  These breakthroughs helped to 
make it possible, as a policy, to rely on the U.S. strategic arsenal as a potent deterrent. 
It is important to recognize that not only was the New Look developed as a 
practical response to events and circumstances, it was also based upon President 
Eisenhower’s tightly held principles.  While the Eisenhower administration is often 
remembered for Massive Retaliation, there was more thought behind this policy, 
including the New Look, that is rarely acknowledged.  The Eisenhower administration 
followed a salient and transparent process to arrive at the New Look.  Additionally, there 
were other factors, like the cessation of hostilities and new technologies, that allowed the 
administration to pursue the strategy.  Indeed, the New Look oversaw a significant 
transformation of the U.S. military to a nuclear fighting force.  Further, this 
transformation impacted many facets of the military’s traditional structure. 
 
Outcomes, Consequences, and Lessons from the New Look 
As with any grand strategy, the implementation occurred over time and the 
consequences, both positive and negative would take time to surface.  Reliance on the 
nuclear arsenal for security and deterrence was pragmatic for fiscal, personal, and policy 
reasons and it had impacts on the services.  The Air Force was the greatest benefactor of 
the New Look since the New Look placed importance on a nuclear arsenal deliverable by 
airpower.  From 1954-1960, the U.S. Air Force averaged 46.5% of the total defense 
budget.  While during the same period, the Army and Naval Service accounted for 25.3% 
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and 28.2%, respectively.42  In contrast, from 1949 to 1953, the Air Force averaged 27.1% 
of the budget, the Army accounted for 44.3% of the budget and the Naval Service 
28.6%.43  In addition, to a larger percentage of the defense budget for the Air Force, the 
number of aircraft and missile platforms capable of bearing a nuclear payload increased.  
During the Eisenhower presidency, from 1953 to 1960, Strategic Air Command increased 
the size of its fleet from 1,830 aircraft to 2,992 aircraft.44  Additionally, 1959 saw the 
largest number of aircraft ever assigned to Strategic Air Command with 3,207 aircraft.45  
While the U.S. also pursued other capabilities besides aircraft to carry nuclear payloads, 
it was not until mid-1959 when the first land- and sea-based missiles began to augment 
aircraft as strategic delivery options. 
Unsurprisingly, one outcome of the New Look was that overall troop numbers in 
the U.S. military declined from 3.3 million in 1954 to 2.5 million in 1960.46  In addition 
to the overall troop levels declining, the U.S. Army reduced the number of its active 
divisions from 20 divisions during the Korean War to 12 active divisions by 1956.47  
Further, the reduction in the number of active duty Army divisions was accompanied by a 
reorganization of the Army’s divisional structures into a pentomic division, that was 
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geared toward fighting and sustaining in a nuclear environment, as well as, on the 
conventional battlefield.48  Army leaders believed that the employment of tactical nuclear 
weapons on the battlefield could help the Army achieve increased firepower while both 
manpower and allocation to conventional ground combat forces were reduced.49  To meet 
these demands, the Army shifted to a tactical nuclear force and developed numerous 
tactical nuclear capabilities, like nuclear-tipped artillery rounds and Honest John 
rockets.50  However, the Army was less fortunate when compared to the Air Force 
because its shift to a tactical nuclear force accompanied a decline in the Army’s overall 
budget from $16 billion in 1953 to $9.3 billion in 1960.51 
  In addition, the Army was proscribed from pursuing a strategic deterrent during 
the New Look when a 1956 memo, from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, 
discouraged the Army from planning the use of missiles beyond 200 miles was penned.52  
Further, the same memo gave sole control authority to operate ground-based intermediate 
range ballistic missiles to the Air Force.53  Interestingly, the Army nearly secured a place 
of prominence in the New Look strategy with the development of the first ballistic 
missile.  However, the Army was forced to turn its missile over to the Air Force because 
the Air Force was developing a similar missile and had already secured the preeminent 
position within the New Look.54 
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On the other hand, the U.S. Navy insulated itself from major cuts with the 
introduction of the Forrestal-class aircraft carrier in 1954.  The Forrestal-class carrier was 
capable of accommodating new jet aircraft that could bear nuclear payloads, which 
secured the Navy a strategic nuclear capability.55  In addition, the Navy sought nuclear 
cruise missiles for its surface ships and ballistic missiles fired from its submarines.  For 
its part in the development of the nuclear triad, the Navy overcame an immense obstacle 
in launching a missile from a submerged vessel.  The submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM), known as the Polaris missile system, came as a requirement in 1956 and 
was tested at the end of the decade.56  Further, the Navy was a participant in nuclear 
power which insulated it from New Look budget cuts.  As early as 1955, the Navy had 
fielded nuclear-powered submarines and its first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS 
Enterprise, would set sail in 1960.57 
One consequence of such a focused investment on nuclear weapons deliverable 
by aircraft was the so-called missile gap.  The Soviet Union performed two successful 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches in the fall of 1957.58  In addition to 
successful ICBM tests, the Soviet Union launched the first satellite, Sputnik, into orbit in 
October of the same year.59  To make matters worse, during the same time, the U.S. had 
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two failed ICBM launch attempts.60  Soviet progress in missile technology shattered 
Eisenhower’s belief that the U.S. would remain technologically superior.  Most 
concerning was that ICBMs upset the nexus between the time of attack and response.  
Missiles can strike in a matter of minutes and cannot be recalled like aircraft.  In addition, 
aircraft must be scrambled and travel through enemy air defenses to reach the target.  It 
was not until almost two years later, in September of 1959, that the U.S. fielded its first 
ICBM, the Atlas-D.61 
The missile gap highlights an important consequence of the New Look and serves 
as the first lesson.  Technological superiority is difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee.  
Confidence in your country’s prowess is important for any leader.  But with confidence, a 
leader should also be prudent to prepare for other scenarios where its prowess is 
challenged.  Of course, it was not in Eisenhower’s nature to prepare for other scenarios 
because he eschewed defense spending that accounted for endless contingencies.  
Eisenhower may be correct that endless preparation may result in overspending, but the 
missile gap shows that it is wise to have a broader strategy with multiple capabilities.  
Here, a balanced approach is best. 
In addition to the missile gap, there were other consequences of a nuclear and 
strategic aircraft centric strategy.  At least one consequence of the New Look was inter-
service rivalry as each service vied for a portion of the defense budget and its unique 
place in the strategy.62  Additionally, service roles and missions were complicated and 
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contested with the introduction of new missiles.63  The Air Force benefited greatly from 
the New Look, not only by securing a large portion of the budget, but also by attaining 
the foremost position within the strategy.  On the other hand, the Army had to prepare to 
fight and sustain in a nuclear environment, which included developing tactical nuclear 
capabilities, while receiving a smaller portion of the budget when compared to the Air 
Force and its historical allocations.  Here is another lesson to be learned; some inter-
service competition is healthy.  However, this competition becomes unhealthy when 
services are vying for funds to grow its importance within a strategy. 
Another consequence of stressing the nuclear strategic deterrent was that the U.S. 
lacked conventional capabilities.  This gives rise to a noticeable quandary with the New 
Look.  The main purpose of the strategic nuclear arsenal was to deter Soviet aggression 
and prevent escalation.  Also, Operation Solarium introduced a more aggressive 
Containment strategy which included subversive operations.  However, New Look 
investments in nuclear capabilities do not seem to be focused on conducting such 
subversive operations.  Admittedly, with a more aggressive check of the Soviet Union, 
the U.S. was placing a great deal of weight on its strategic arsenal to prevent escalation. 
This leaves one with the question, what would have happened if the Soviet Union 
was not deterred from taking an action to confront the new U.S. Containment strategy?  It 
is difficult to project but the U.S. was preparing to conduct nuclear operations in the 
event of general and limited conflict with the Soviet Union.  Both the reliance on the 
strategic arsenal and the Army’s integration of nuclear battlefield weapons to increase 
firepower support this claim.  U.S. and NATO forces would have only been a tripwire to 
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a Soviet conventional invasion of Central Europe.  The fact of the matter was that the 
U.S. would have had no other recourse than to use nuclear weapons, strategic or 
battlefield, in limited conflict or general war.  Obviously, this reality helped to bolster the 
threat of Massive Retaliation, but if the U.S. did not want to utilize nuclear weapons, it 
may not have had another option.  Of course, this quandary led to the Kennedy 
administration’s strategy of Flexible Response in the next decade.  The lesson from this 
quandary is that it is beneficial to have multiple options at a leader’s disposal if 
deterrence fails. 
The New Look sought to reign in defense spending, and while the U.S. was able 
to cut manpower spending, the U.S. still needed to fund the build up its strategic, theater 
and tactical nuclear capabilities.  For perspective, according to a Brookings Institution 
study, the U.S. spent an estimated $5.5 trillion on the development, production, and the 
systems to deliver, and defend against nuclear weapons from World War II to 1996.64  Of 
the $5 trillion, 22%, or $1.1 trillion, was spent on nuclear programs from 1945 to 1960.65  
In addition, it was noted above that even with manpower reductions, Eisenhower was 
unable to reduce defense spending to his desired levels.  This was because it cost more 
than projected to develop the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  This point gives rise to a very evident 
lesson; Pentagon programs are often more expensive than first estimated. 
Truly, the nuclear arsenal has been an expensive investment.  Further, it is 
difficult to determine the actual deterrent value associated with nuclear weapons.  
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Whether the U.S. strategic arsenal deterred Soviet aggression is difficult to ascertain.  
The fact that the Soviet Union and the U.S. avoided a nuclear exchange is not proof that 
the New Look succeeded in deterring the Soviet Union.  Then again, if the arsenal served 
as an avenue for negotiations and meetings between the two nations to resolve issues and 
thus avoid war, then nuclear weapons may have served an integral secondary purpose. 
Most significantly, the first offset resulted in the foundation of the U.S. strategic 
nuclear arsenal, including the nuclear triad, which continues to be a mainstay of U.S. 
defense and security.  While, strategies, policies, and views for the use of unconventional 
weapons has evolved over time, the maintenance of a strategic arsenal has endured.  The 
strategic deterrent and nuclear triad continue to be discussed today.  Further, the strategic 
arsenal has paved the way for other policies, like extended deterrence, which is crucial 
toward demonstrating U.S. commitment to its allies.  Moreover, extended deterrence is 
one way the U.S. contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.  It is doubtful 
that the Eisenhower administration anticipated the long-term outcomes of the New Look.  
The lesson to be taken from this reality is that strategies can have lasting impacts on the 
U.S. defense culture.  In addition, some ramifications cannot be foreseen by the initiators 
of the strategy.  
In conclusion, not only did the New Look fit the fiscal constraints of the 
Eisenhower administration, it was a feasible strategy because the U.S. enjoyed an 
advantage over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapon technology, during this period.  As a 
result of the New Look, the U.S. built up its nuclear forces, fielding and deploying B-52s, 
ICBMs, and SLBMs.  Because the strategy focused on the use of nuclear weapons, U.S. 
conventional forces were intended to support nuclear operations.  Unfortunately, the U.S. 
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reliance on nuclear weapons in its defense strategy had drawbacks that would appear 
after the Eisenhower administration had left the White House.  Foremost, U.S. advantage 
in nuclear weapon technology was brief and the Soviet Union quickly closed the nuclear 
weapon technology gap. 
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THE SECOND OFFSET 
 
Introduction to the Second Offset 
As defined by the Pentagon, the second offset was the period of time during the 
1970s and 1980s when the U.S. invested heavily in precision guided munitions, long 
range/stealth aircraft, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms.66  Unlike 
the first offset period, that is clearly defined by the New Look, the second offset cannot 
be attached to one administration or condensed to a sole strategy.  On the contrary, the 
second offset spanned twenty years and included multiple administrations and Pentagon 
leaders.  In addition, while the New Look relied on the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal for 
security, the second offset sought to bolster conventional deterrence by outfitting 
platforms and weapons with over the horizon technologies.  Over the horizon or, 
emerging technologies, would serve to increase battlefield awareness, capability, depth, 
and scope to make U.S. conventional platforms more accurate, while simultaneously 
reducing collateral damage and fratricide. 
The above definition of the second offset is used by current Pentagon leaders 
when introducing the third offset.  It is important to recognize that this definition is 
technology centric.  An element the Pentagon definition omits, but was nonetheless 
crucial to the success of the second offset, was the transformation of U.S. military 
doctrines, warfighting concepts, and training that took place after the Vietnam War and 
until the Soviet Union collapsed.  Indeed, there were a few major military doctrines that 
were promulgated during this time, the most prominent was the AirLand Battle Doctrine.  
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These military doctrines accompanied a focused shift in U.S. military strategy away from 
a counterinsurgency type conflict in Vietnam to confronting and deterring the Soviet 
threat.  In addition to military doctrines, the U.S. military transformed into an All-
Volunteer Force while at the same time boosting military training. 
As with the New Look, the second offset was influenced by external factors.  
While the U.S. was concentrated on stemming Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, 
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were undertaking significant modernizations, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, to its conventional and nuclear forces.  These 
modernizations were creating a growing imbalance, when compared to Soviet resources, 
along the Inter-German border during the early 1970s.  Further, during the 1970s the 
Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. and then, quickly surpassed the U.S. 
arsenal.  These two factors placed serious doubts within the minds of U.S. leaders about 
the balance of power.  For example, a 1976 National Intelligence Estimate described the 
strategic imbalance between the U.S and the Soviet Union as “sizeable” in favor of the 
Soviet Union.67  According to the same document, the imbalance provided the Soviets an 
increasing ability to “coerce at all levels of confrontation”.68 
The efforts of the second offset were put on display in 1991, during the Persian 
Gulf War, when the U.S. decimated the Soviet capabilities that comprised Saddam 
Hussein’s military.  The Persian Gulf War proved that the U.S. military’s integration of 
emerging technologies into its platforms had been worthwhile.  Additionally, the U.S. 
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military established itself as the preeminent military power in the Post-Cold War security 
environment.  Indeed, the U.S. military underwent a dramatic transformation from the 
Vietnam War to the Gulf War.  This section will begin by describing the increasing 
Soviet threat that compelled U.S. leaders to pursue changes beginning in the 1970s.  
Next, this section will discuss the technologies, doctrines and training reforms that were 
pursued and effectively changed the U.S. military.  Finally, as in the first offset portion, 
this section will detail any valuable lessons that can be garnered from this offset and 
applied to the third offset. 
 
The Two-Fold Soviet Threat   
During much of the 1960s, the slow escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
dominated the attention of U.S. leadership and the military enterprise.  However, with the 
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1973, the U.S. pivoted its attentions to the 
increasing Soviet threat and possible conflict in Central Europe.  As stated above, there 
was a growing uneasiness over the U.S. ability to deter Soviet military action due to 
Soviet conventional and nuclear modernizations.  The qualitative and quantitative 
improvements of the Soviet Union impacted U.S. perceptions concerning the balance of 
power and the prevailing thought was that with nuclear parity, as well as numerical and 
qualitative superiority, the Soviets would no longer be deterred from a conventional 
invasion of Central Europe.69 
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The 1973 Annual Defense Department Report, presented by then Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird, stated that strategic realities had come into sharper focus because 
Soviet buildups had gained greater “momentum” than was projected in the previous 
year.70  For example, Secretary Laird pointed to a more rapid development than was 
expected with regard to the Soviet submarine ballistic missile program.71  Additional 
Soviet undertakings, identified in the report, included the identification of 100 new ICBM 
silos, the continued construction of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) site surrounding 
Moscow, Soviet Naval and aircraft modernizations, and finally, two new Soviet battle 
tanks that the U.S. believed were in production.72 
Indeed from the end of the 1960’s, through the early 1970s, there were noticeable 
increases in the number of Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, and overall strategic launch 
vehicles.73  In 1966, the Soviet Union had fewer than 400 ICBM launchers and by 1972 
had almost 1,600 ICBM launchers at its disposal; whereas the U.S. remained constant 
with just under 1,200 ICBM launchers from 1967 to 1972.74  In addition, the Soviet 
Union increased from under 200 SLBM launchers in 1968 to over 500 by 1972.75  Similar 
to its ICBM numbers, the U.S. remained constant with over 600 SLBM launchers from 
1967 to 1972.76  As for strategic bombers, in 1972 the U.S. maintained over 400 strategic 
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aircraft while the Soviet Union maintained fewer than 200.77  Overall, from 1963 to 1972 
the U.S. maintained over 2,000 intercontinental strategic launch vehicles, while during 
the same period, the Soviets increased from under 500 strategic launch vehicles to around 
2,300.78 
Not only had the Soviet Union expanded its strategic delivery vehicles during the 
1970s, the Soviet Union also qualitatively improved its nuclear forces.  Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 1977 Annual Report to Congress outlines the major 
qualitative gains in Soviet nuclear capabilities.  From 1965 to 1976, the Soviet Union 
developed seven new ICBMs compared to zero for the U.S.79  In addition, three of its 
newest ICBM missile silos were hardened and the missiles had been outfitted with 
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV).80  It was believed that the 
Soviet ICBM, the SS-19, was capable of carrying 8-10 MIRVs.81  Further, the Soviet 
Union was developing a MIRV capability for its SLBM fleet, a new land-based mobile 
ICBM launcher to augment its current mobile launcher, and had added a new long-range 
bomber dubbed the “Backfire” to its suite of strategic capabilities.82  Finally, in 1978 the 
Soviet Union surpassed the U.S. nuclear arsenal with an inventory of 25,393 warheads 
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compared to the U.S. inventory of 24,243 warheads; this was the first time that the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal was larger than the U.S. arsenal.83 
Not only was the Soviet Union modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal and 
capabilities, it was also modernizing and increasing its conventional capabilities.  In the 
1973 Defense annual report mentioned above, the Soviet Union had 160 divisions.84  
Four years later, the number of Soviet divisions had increased to 170 divisions with 31 
divisions and supporting aircraft located in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary.85  According to the 1977 Defense annual report, the Soviet military comprised 
4.4 million people compared to 2.1 million in the U.S. Armed Forces.86  In addition, 
Soviet conventional qualitative improvements were occurring across the board.  The 1973 
annual report outlines numerous new and developing aircraft and naval vessels.87  
Further, the Soviet Union developed two new battle tanks, the T-64 and T-72, during the 
1970s which were more sophisticated than the U.S. M-60 tank of the same period.  The 
M-60 Patton, which had been fielded in 1959, was little more than an upgraded Sherman 
tank used in World War II.88 
Quantitative parity was unfeasible during the Cold War for the U.S. and its allies.  
Politically and fiscally the West was incapable of such an effort.  Therefore, it was 
imperative the U.S. pursue a different approach to offset its disadvantages.  One solution 
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to this dilemma was to exploit emerging technologies to increase the U.S. military’s 
efficiency, effectiveness, and battlefield awareness.  The integration of advanced 
technologies within military platforms and weapons systems would act as force 
multipliers to attenuate Soviet numbers.  However, there were additional issues that 
needed to be addressed if the U.S. was to rely on technology to offset the Soviet threat.  
The U.S. would need to develop a new fighting doctrine that suitably applied the 
advancements.  Also, personnel changes and training improvements would be paramount 
for the U.S. to capitalize on the integration of technology in its platforms and capabilities. 
 
The Plan, the Challenges, and the Lessons 
The technologies exploited to rectify the conventional imbalance were derived 
from The Long Range Research and Development Planning Program, (LRRDPP).  The 
LRRDPP began in 1973 and was conducted by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
the predecessor to today’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA.89  
The LRRDPP was instrumental in identifying those capabilities that would yield a more 
effective future force and resulted in a set of recommendations “deemed to be of strategic 
importance to reshaping the battlefield of the future.”90  The scientific recommendations 
included technologies that would enhance precision guided munitions, long range/stealth 
aircraft, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms. 
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The LRRDPP was the Cater administration’s contribution to the second offset as 
it set the strategic vision and the technological foundation for platforms and capabilities 
that were fielded in later years.  An instrumental figure in the Carter cabinet was 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.  Brown had a strong scientific and academic 
background and authorized the development of stealth technologies to defeat enemy air 
defenses.91  Additionally, he backed the development of the MX missile, which was 
fielded in the subsequent administration, to replace the aging Minuteman and Titian 
ballistic missiles.92  Also, instrumental in setting the technological foundation was the 
continuity and support of Pentagon workers in the research and development branches.93  
These members continued the technological pursuit regardless of whom was Secretary of 
Defense or who was in the White House.  The importance of this continuity cannot be 
underestimated and is the first lesson to be garnered from the second offset.  Pentagon 
programs endure a byzantine process.  From research and development, to testing and 
evaluation.  Once those phases are completed, the procurement and ultimately, fielding of 
platforms and capabilities can occur.  With such an intricate process, it is easy to see why 
programs are contentious and incur budget and schedule overruns as contract 
requirements are changed or updated throughout the process.  Reforms and 
transformations do not occur overnight and neither can capabilities be fielded as quickly.  
Therefore, success relies on subsequent leaders’ dedication to back reforms throughout 
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development to fielding.  Also crucial is a permeation of the defense culture to sustain 
reforms.   
The U.S. pursued upgrades to its nuclear arsenal during the second offset, for 
instance, the MX missile, however, it was relevant that advanced technologies be 
integrated specifically for conventional capabilities.  While nuclear weapons were a 
staple of the defense culture at the time and were integral to deterrence and security, the 
U.S. was conducting conventional interventions around the globe to thwart the spread of 
Communism.  The Soviet threat was global, not confined to the Inter-German border as 
so often reminisced.  Interventions occurred in Vietnam, the Middle East and as close as 
Nicaragua in Central America, to name a few.  Even Soviet operations, like the invasion 
of Afghanistan which began in 1979, was a conventional operation.  These conflicts show 
that conflicts occurring around the globe were conventional in nature.  Therefore, highly 
efficient conventional capabilities were a practical response to the security environment 
of the era.  The importance of adopting platforms and capabilities commensurate to the 
operations and missions being conducted is another lesson to be gleaned from the second 
offset period.  If the third offset is to succeed, it must pursue platforms and technologies 
useful to the types of operations the U.S. will conduct in the future. 
For example, as a result of U.S. emphasis on nuclear weapons for deterrence that 
permeated the defense culture since the New Look, U.S. forces were trained and 
equipped to fight a nuclear war; not a slow convention escalation which occurred in 
Vietnam.  The inadequacy of U.S. military platforms to conduct conventional operations 
is best illustrated by the loss of aircraft the U.S. experienced during the conflict.  The Air 
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Force lost 385 out of a total 833 F-105’s.94  The Air Force F-105 was a fighter-bomber 
originally designed as a nuclear attack aircraft during the New Look.  Against Soviet 
MiGs, over the skies of Vietnam, kill ratios for U.S. aircrews were a mere 2.4 to 1.95  For 
perspective, in World War II kill ratios were 8 to 1 and the Korean War saw kill ratios as 
high as 14: 1.96  These aircraft were designed for nuclear operations, not conventional 
bombing, dogfighting, and close air support; the missions these airframes were 
conducting over the skies of Southeast Asia.  The number of losses can be directly 
attributed to the New Look and the U.S. direction to pursue a robust nuclear arsenal to the 
detriment of conventional purpose airframes.   
As mentioned above, it was both a political and a fiscal impossibility for the U.S. 
and its allies to match the Warsaw pact numerically.  With the institution of the All-
Volunteer Force in 1973, the U.S. was incapable of conscripting to meet Soviet strength 
numerically.  In addition, the transition to an All-Volunteer Force created a fiscal 
constraint to meeting Warsaw Pact numbers.  An interesting attribute of volunteer 
militaries is that they are more expensive than conscript militaries.  This happens 
because, in order to recruit members, benefits such as health, pay, retirement, bonuses, 
and schooling are increased to lure recruits.97  Benefits must also be increased to retain 
members after an initial enlistment, in order to grow the senior enlisted and officer corps. 
Yet another fiscal constraint was the economic downturn that resulted from the 
Energy Crisis during the mid-1970s.  This downturn portended the U.S. Department of 
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Defense did not receive an increased budget during the second offset period.98  
Additionally, because the U.S. military had to increase pay to its members, without an 
increased budget, and confront the Soviet threat, advanced technologies offered a 
solution to this complex fiscal dilemma.  On the other hand, technology was not the only 
solution to this challenge.  The U.S. military alleviated some manpower issues when it 
opened more non-combat military occupations to women and shifted some non-combat 
duties to the reserve component.99 
If the conventional and nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union compelled the 
U.S. to pursue reforms, it was political and fiscal realities that led the U.S. to select 
technologically advanced capabilities as the solution to its dilemma.  Indeed, there were 
numerous technological innovations that greatly increased U.S. efficiency, effectiveness, 
and awareness during the second offset period.  These technologies were adapted to 
platforms beginning in the 1970s and were fielded by the 1980s.  The efficiency, 
effectiveness, and awareness of technologically advanced platforms were compounded 
with augmented training and doctrinal transformations. 
Doctrinal transformations and training improvements began alongside the 
LRRDPP in the early 1970s.  The LRRDPP was not responsible for these transformations 
and improvements occurred organically as the forces professionalized training and 
doctrine.  In 1973, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was 
                                                 
98. Ibid., 31-32. 
99. Richard Stewart, American Military History:  The United States Army in a Global 
Era, 1917-2008, Volume II, (Washington, DC:  Center of Military History, 2010),  377 & 
380, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30-22/CMH_Pub_30-22.pdf. 
 39 
instituted.100  The institution of TRADOC was an important development during this 
period because it elevated the status of warfighting concepts and training as an important 
feature of the military system.  During this period, the first warfighting doctrine to be 
announced by TRADOC was called Active Defense.  The basic premise of Active 
Defense was to quickly concentrate U.S. and NATO forces at Warsaw Pact breakthrough 
points and scrap with Soviet forces to prevent a breakthrough.101  The principal drawback 
with this doctrine was that it did not address follow on forces and other facets of the 
Soviet military apparatus integral to conventional operations, like command and control 
links.  It was inconceivable that NATO and U.S. forces would be able to stymie Warsaw 
Pact forces indefinitely without addressing second echelon forces and command, control, 
and communication assets. 
From Active Defense evolved the famous AirLand Battle Doctrine.  The 1982 
Army manual outlining the doctrine stated the U.S. Army should able to “fight 
outnumbered and win”.102  Interestingly, the AirLand Battle Doctrine was based on 
Soviet military philosophy, which viewed an enemy holistically and not as a collection of 
individual units.103  This philosophy sought to destroy follow on forces and other 
components of an enemy’s military system by attacking the enemy throughout its 
defense, not solely on the front line.  Because the Warsaw Pact had the numerical 
advantage when it came to manpower, artillery, and tanks, the U.S. had to counterbalance 
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the advantage with a doctrinal focus that took advantage of technological advances and 
applied them to changes in the conduct of joint and service operational maneuvers.  The 
objective was to inflict enough losses on the enemy to undermine and overcome its 
strength. 
The U.S. AirLand Battle Doctrine exploited the concept of addressing an enemy’s 
capabilities throughout its military structure to engage in close, rear, and deep 
operations.104  AirLand Battle sought to reduce the Warsaw Pact second echelon forces 
and destroy enemy command, control, and communication assets to cause the Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact forces to be less effective by sending them into disarray.  Technology 
would be utilized, in a combination of platforms, with overlapping capabilities, in an 
effort to improve NATO firepower.105  The objective was to see all targets on the 
battlefield and be capable of destroying each target with one shot.  The Airborne Warning 
and Control System (AWACS) increased battlefield awareness, precision munitions 
would help to reduce Soviet forces to manageable levels, and stealth aircraft capable of 
defeating enemy radars would strike second echelon targets to relieve the front line.106 
In addition to the doctrinal transformations, there were also training reforms.  
TRADOC emphasized the importance of peacetime training because leaders believed 
future conflicts would be quick engagements that would not permit the activation of a 
civilian army in time to reach the conflict.107  Therefore, the standing All-Volunteer 
Force had to be a well-trained and tested professional army.  Training helped the military 
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increase its performance before battle and it was fiscally advantageous.  The Army 
conducted a study and found that it was more expensive to replace a trained tank crew 
than it was to field a new tank.108  Therefore, the tank was a battlefield instrument that 
needed to ensure the survivability of the crew.  TRADOC solved the conundrum of battle 
testing its force without putting at risk lives and equipment.  The Army introduced 
National Training Centers or, NTCs, which were large swaths of land dedicated to force 
on force training, simulations, and wargames.109  With the arrival of training tools, like 
the MILES Laser System, force on force training become more realistic and the system 
no longer relied on a referee’s judgment, but instead was controlled by impartial 
computers.110  These training reforms allowed the force to obtain tactical and technical 
proficiency before an actual engagement with the enemy.  The result was that leaders saw 
how tactics and platforms performed in almost real-life scenarios. 
The air services were also rethinking training.  Similar to the Army and its tank 
crew study, the air services conducted its own study and found that most aircrews were 
lost in the first 8-10 missions.111  The air service reckoned it could complete those first 8-
10 missions under simulation, with realistic training, and increase the survivability of 
aircrews and aircraft.  The best reflection of this change was in 1972 when an elite pilot 
training program was founded known as Topgun.  Alongside training, aircraft platforms 
were being rethought.  The Air Force learned from its inadequate kill ratio over the skies 
of Southeast Asia and broke up its airframe designs into smaller programs for specific 
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purposes.  Hence the development of the F-15 Eagle for air to air combat and the B-1 
Lancer for bombing.  Each airframe was designed for different missions and thus were 
better prepared for those specific missions.112 
The discussion about airframes offers an important insight for today concerning 
the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the air services chose to 
pursue different airframes for different missions.  Today, the U.S. is pursuing platforms 
designed for multi-roles.  While in theory, a multi-role aircraft, that is co-developed by 
the services, with minor changes to fit specific needs of the service, seems like an 
effective way to save money, the program has been plagued with cost and schedule 
overruns.  These overruns can be attributed to the defense enterprise changing the 
contract requirements and chasing the newest technology.  Therefore, even today, a 
platform with a multi-role mission may not be the best option to pursue due to the 
bureaucratic process of development through fielding.  In addition, a detractor of the F-35 
could argue that if the fighter is intended to fulfill multiple roles, then it calls into 
question the aircraft’s ability to adequately fulfill one of those roles. 
An excellent case study that illustrates the crux of the second offset, the 
technology, concepts, and overlapping capabilities, is the Army’s Big Five; the M1 
Abrams tank, the M2 Bradley Infantry Vehicle, the Apache and Black Hawk helicopters 
and the Patriot missile system.113  A significant historical event, that stimulated U.S. 
thought during the second offset and generated the Big Five, was the Yom Kippur War of 
1973.114  Interestingly, many U.S. officials believed that tank warfare had become 
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superannuated after this conflict.  Combined, the Arabs and Israelis lost more tanks than 
the U.S. possessed in Europe.115  The reason for the high loss of tanks in this conflict is 
attributable to the use of anti-tank missiles which granted both belligerents standoff 
distance to engage armor outside the range of the tank’s main gun.  In addition, anti-tank 
missiles were a potent firepower weapon because an armor resilient enough to protect 
tanks did not exist. 
However, the assumption that tank warfare was obsolete would prove to be 
incorrect with the arrival of ceramic composite armor.  The M1 Abrams took advantage 
of ceramic armor which is lighter and stronger than steel allowing the Abrams a high 
level of mobility and speed without sacrificing protection.  In addition to the new armor, 
the cannon was stabilized by a computer that accounted for speed, wind, elevation, and 
other physical factors.116  Also, the tank round was greatly improved with the arrival of 
stabilizers and penetration rods.117  Not only was the Abrams more resilient and more 
potent than its predecessors, but the introduction of a suite of platforms would help the 
U.S. military outclass adversarial forces.   
The second platform in the Army’s Big Five is the infantry combat vehicle named 
the M2 Bradley.  The Bradley was designed with a smaller cannon and machine guns for 
close-in fighting, as well as, the ability to transport infantry.118  Further, the M2 is 
equipped with a TOW missile, granting the Bradley the capability to engage tank armor 
at distance to protect the Abrams from anti-tank missiles, thus allowing the Abrams to 
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close distance.  The third platform of the Big Five is the AH-64 A Apache helicopter 
built as an anti-tank capability to fly close to the ground in a high-intensity battle.  The 
Apache was delivered to units in 1983 and was later equipped with night vision and 
sensing devices enabling the helicopter to fly in different types of environments.119  The 
UH-60 A Blackhawk helicopter is a transport platform and is the fourth in the Big Five.  
The Blackhawk is utilized to transport troops and equipment to and from the battlefield.  
The last platform is the Patriot air defense missile which originally began as an anti-air 
capability guided by computer and radar.  The Patriot system was later developed into an 
anti-missile capability to protect against tactical missiles like the Soviet SCUD missile.  
The Big Five utilized unique technological advancements and were developed to work in 
tandem and augment one another.  These capabilities were ideal for AirLand Battle and 
continue to be an impressive suite of capabilities that continue to be modified as needed.  
The principal lesson to be learned from the second offset is that technology is not 
a panacea.  It enhances capabilities, but by itself, it does not have transformative powers.  
It is in the hands of well-trained troops and utilized in well-thought operational concepts 
that technologies flourish and the entire military enterprise benefits and advances.  It is 
difficult to assign greater or lesser value to any single pursuit in this transformation.  
Without technology, the AirLand Battle Doctrine would not have been a feasible strategy.  
Likewise, without doctrine and training, technology would not have been applied 
systematically to the military enterprise.  The nexus between technology, doctrine, and 
training was an ecosystem of symbiotic relationships; each performed a necessary 
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function and coalesced to produce a major transformation.  Importantly, the second offset 
period capitalized on new technologies and other reforms. 
Secretary of Defense Brown would later reflect on the second offset period and 
say “The Carter Administration initiated and developed these programs, the Reagan 
Administration paid for their acquisition in many cases and the…Bush Administration 
employed them.”120  Indeed, the second offset platforms and the accompanying 
warfighting concepts were not employed against the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe.  
While many leaders, strategists, and academics, on both sides, speculated the results of a 
conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it impossible to state with certainty the 
outcome.  On the other hand, the Persian Gulf War gives some insight into the return 
value of second offset investments.  The decimation of Saddam Hussein’s Soviet military 
capabilities validated U.S. efforts. 
While the Pentagon definition of the second offset period seems to end with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it would be remiss not to mention advancements that 
occurred following this period.  Truly, second offset capabilities enabled the U.S. to step 
into the role of the sole superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  The second 
offset’s advanced technologies were used in conflicts and interventions in the early 1990s 
in Iraq and the Balkans.  Smart munitions are heralded in these campaigns because of 
improved accuracy, collateral damage was mitigated.  Original smart munitions were 
optically guided, then laser guided, and now GPS guided.121  However, these controlled 
operations would not have been possible without the integration of information 
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technology in the battle space that allowed U.S. forces to view the entire battlefield.  A 
main effort undertaken by the Army in the 1990s, was to multiply its information sharing 
and communication ability by digitizing its force; viewing the battlefield in real time.122 
The importance of advanced technologies did not end with the turn of the century.  
Within its first year, the Bush administration launched a “new triad” which placed 
emphasis on conventional strike capabilities alongside unconventional capabilities, a 
missile defense system, and a robust defense infrastructure.  Further, the U.S. has relied 
on technologies developed during the second offset for operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan over the past 15 years, including smart munitions and ISR platforms.  
Although investments in the second offset began in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. has 
continued to evolve, both the technologies and strategies. 
The U.S. continues to possess an operational advantage with the technologies and 
platforms that were developed during the second offset.  However, the U.S. advantage in 
these technologies is eroding, therefore, the third offset is designed to address this 
dwindling lead.  It is not inconsequential that the U.S. has enjoyed an advantage in 
second offset technologies for almost 40 years.  In reality, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, there was no country, opposed to the U.S., that had the knowledge base and 
infrastructure to challenge the U.S. advantage.  As seen from the New Look, the U.S. 
advantage in nuclear weapon technology was fleeting because there was a competitor 
with the technological and intellectual base to challenge U.S. nuclear superiority.  In 
addition, the security environment of the New Look and second offset are starkly 
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different from today’s.  Further, the current offset is expected to compete in the future 
security environment.  Therefore, before introducing and analyzing the third offset, it is 
important to describe elements U.S. planners predict will comprise the future security 
environment. 
 48 
THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
If previous offsets have been pursued in response to specific threats, coupled with 
the prevailing security challenges and environment of their respective eras, then it is 
advantageous to detail the future security environment that the third offset is intended to 
compete in.  In addition, this is valuable because the success of the third offset hinges on 
whether the major thrusts of this strategy are well aimed to confront future challenges.  
Indeed, it is difficult to predict the future security environment and any threat projection 
should be met with a certain amount of skepticism.  Although threat forecasting is an 
inexactable task, it is nonetheless useful to provide guidance and ensure U.S. forces do 
not languish.  Acknowledging the uncertainness of this task reinforces the need for 
adaptable forces capable of confronting a myriad of emerging and unknown threats.  
With the guidance of U.S. strategic documents, like the National Military Strategy, 
National Security Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review, future threats and 
challenges the U.S. is envisaging can be gleaned. 
In the 2015 National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
characterized the global security environment as the most unpredictable he has seen in his 
40 years of service.123  According to the same document, the U.S. currently faces multiple 
and simultaneous security challenges from many threat actors with a wide array of 
capabilities.  This has created a security environment that is complex and prone to rapid 
changes.  These rapid changes are fueled by a number of factors including demographic 
shifts, globalization, altering power dynamics, and the diffusion of technology.  These 
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characteristics, indicative of the current environment, are expected to continue.  Other 
strategic documents echo the National Military Strategy in this view. 
At first glance, it seems outside the scope of normal military preparation to 
account for shifting demographics.  However, this assumption is misplaced.  According 
to a Center for Strategic and International Studies assessment, which compiled 
demographic data, the world population is expected to grow from the current 7.3 billion 
people to 9.4 billion people by 2045.124  Most of this growth is expected to occur in 
developing countries.  Also, the population surge in developing countries will occur as 
the populations of industrialized nations grow older.  Further, the number of megacities, 
defined as dense urban areas with a population more than 10 million people, will increase 
from 29 to 40 by 2030.125 
The impacts of demographic shifts on the future security environment are 
numerous.  One could imagine a future replete with food and water shortages, as well as, 
energy crises.  Resource shortages, coupled with a lack of economic opportunities caused 
by population growth and the replacement of human jobs with technology, could foment 
a large disaffected population that could easily destabilize a nation.  The current refugee 
crisis, triggered by the Syrian Civil War, offers an observation into impacts on the 
security environment caused by demographic shifts.  In the short term, the mass 
migration of peoples to more stable, safe, and secure places in the West has raised 
security concerns about vetting.  In addition, if the millions of displaced people do not 
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return to their homeland after the region stabilizes, the population could have a lasting 
impact on the countries where refugees settle.  The above scenarios are bleak results of 
changing demographics.  On the other hand, population growth, that is well managed, 
could engender a new partner for the U.S. or the birth of a regional hegemon that is a 
security provider for its region. 
Of particular concern for military operations is the urbanization of the world’s 
population.  According to a United Nations study, 54% of people live in urban areas and 
this percentage is expected to rise to 66% of the population by 2050.126  As mentioned 
above, the number of megacities is expected to increase as well.  As previous conflicts in 
this, and past centuries have demonstrated, it is extremely difficult to conduct military 
operations in urban environments.  An organized, effective, and balanced military 
operation in such an environment takes unique training and conditioning.  Differentiating 
between civilians, hostile actors that may not fall within traditional parameters as 
combatants, and actual adversarial military forces, will become increasing difficult in the 
future.  Also, ingress and egress from these zones will require a collection of platforms 
and capabilities that are suited to the urban environment. 
Not only will the population increase, but the future population will also be more 
connected.  Globalization and the diffusion of technology have revolutionized 
interactions amongst people, organizations, and governments, at all levels.  Using digital 
communication and social media, events and ideas spread quickly throughout the world, 
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seemingly unencumbered by national boundaries.  One can imagine a future security 
environment ripe with the use of digital information.  While globalization and the 
diffusion of technology have positively impacted humankind, both have created unique 
challenges for the U.S. military.  For example, the diffusion of technology is challenging 
the U.S. competitive advantage in military systems, like early warning and precision 
strike capabilities.  Three of the U.S. strategy documents acknowledge that the U.S. will 
be operating in a future environment replete with sophisticated technologies like ballistic 
missiles, unmanned systems, space, and cyber capabilities.127,128,129 
Indeed, U.S. adversaries are developing the above capabilities to counter the U.S. 
technological advantage to challenge U.S. power.  Currently, China and Russia are 
modernizing their respective forces to neutralize the suite of U.S. second offset 
technologies.  Moreover, the demonstrated use of second offset technologies and 
platforms in conflict serve as both a model to emulate and a guide to overcome.  Whether 
from large states or small power brokers, there is no doubt that the U.S. will face 
increasingly technologically capable adversaries in the future. 
Although the National Military Strategy and other documents are cognizant of a 
future where technology is more widespread to a range of actors, these documents do not 
mention efforts to curtail the diffusion technology.  While the U.S. continues to support 
counterproliferation and nonproliferation sentiments efforts with respect to ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the strategy documents do not mention 
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sentiments to stem the diffusion of technology.  To the contrary, an element of building 
stronger relationships with allies consists of assisting allies and partners with developing 
their own technologically adept forces.130  The goal of this effort is to increase the 
deterrent and fighting capability of allies and partners resulting in increased security 
overall.  While increased security and strengthened relationships are positive, at least one 
drawback is the creation of an additional avenue to diffuse technology.  This could mean 
that adversaries may be able to access proprietary U.S. technology sooner. 
Not mentioned in the overarching strategy documents, but important to mention, 
are emerging technology sectors that are believed to offer an opportunity for any actor 
that can harness the scientific powers of these sectors to fabricate revolutionary 
capabilities.  The most notable are the biotechnology and nanotechnology sectors.  A 
variety of states, large and small, wealthy and less wealthy, have set in motion 
government-backed initiatives aimed at developing these sectors to upset the traditional 
balance of power.131  What makes these sectors appealing is that the threshold; cash, 
knowledge, and infrastructure, for these type of technology centers is less when 
compared with other types of technologies, like nuclear.  Essentially, it is easier for less 
advanced states to compete with more advanced nations to research, develop, and 
ultimately breakthrough, in these sectors.  This shows that not only is the diffusion of 
technology an element of the future security environment, but also research and 
development will be more competitive and will not be solely reserved for states with 
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large defense-industrial enterprises.  This could signify that smaller countries may 
become more empowered in the future. 
An added element of these technologies that has ramifications for the future 
security environment is the dual-use nature of these programs.  Both nanotechnology and 
biotechnology have applications in the civilian and military worlds.132  For example, a 
biotechnology center studying a cure for a disease could also covertly be enhancing the 
lethality of biological warfare agents.  Or a nanotechnology center could quickly convert 
research from civilian applications to military uses in a time of national emergency.  The 
dual-use characteristic of these technologies creates the need for better intelligence to 
discover any furtive motives of these programs.  However, the ability to adequately 
review each program may be an insurmountable task based on the number of such centers 
increasing around the world.    
While things may appear differently in the future, U.S. strategy documents assert 
that nation-states will remain the international system’s dominant actors in the future 
security environment.133  This prediction seems to be based parochially in that it is 
difficult for the current generation to imagine the Westphalian power structure ending.  
Although, this prediction has been strengthened by recent events; namely the Brexit vote.  
There seems to be growing push back against international organizations and their ability 
to regulate member nations’ powers.  However, it is difficult to extrapolate this sentiment 
as enduring or ephemeral. 
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Indeed, there are some revisionist states attempting to create new international 
norms and behaviors, as well as, new centers of power using unique methods to 
undermine the traditional system.  For instance, the Russian sponsored invasion of 
Crimea has utilized overlapping state and non-state violence where the actors have 
blended techniques, capabilities, and resources.134 This type of overlapping techniques is 
referred to as hybrid conflict and has become common to the vernacular of the security 
and defense communities.  A feature of hybrid conflict is that it creates ambiguity as to 
the threat actor’s actual and perceived involvement and thus complicates decision making 
for any actor wishing to combat hybrid conflict.  In addition, hybrid warfare offers the 
aggressor a way to circumvent international organizations by allowing the aggressor to 
deny the breadth and depth of involvement and support.135 
On the other hand, China is employing what some refer to as lawfare; using or 
misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational 
objective.136  By using existing international law, China is attempting to redraw its 
territorial boundaries by reclaiming disputed islands, reefs, and atolls in the South China 
Sea.  This territory is highly contested due to its numerous resources and strategic value.  
Not only is the Sea believed to contain an abundant oil and gas reserve, a significant 
amount of the world’s shipping traffic passes through the South China Sea.  By claiming 
and occupying these islands, China could use international norms to extend its territorial 
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waters to encompass the South China Sea in its entirety.137  Whether through hybrid 
warfare or lawfare, what can be projected is that these types of strategies will continue to 
be employed in the future security environment if states can achieve goals and objectives 
through these methods. 
While states will most likely remain dominant actors in the international system, 
non-state actors like violent terrorist organizations will continue to be prevalent.  Military 
incursions and operations, led by the West and its allies, to combat extremism in the 
Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia have remained steady.  These operations 
have remained steady despite a more than decade-long battle with terrorist affiliates in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, by the U.S. and its partners.  Terrorism has been utilized as a tactic 
for centuries; therefore, it is unlikely to be eliminated.  Two mistakes are often made 
when appraising terrorism in today’s security environment that must be rectified for the 
future security environment.  First, that terrorism is a phenomenon associated solely with 
Islam and initiated by the 9/11 attacks.  In reality, the U.S. and allies have been dealing 
with Islamic extremism for decades before September 11, 2001.  Therefore, it is 
important to widen our historical perspective when examining the threat posed by 
terrorism.  Second, it is wrong to assume that any ideology can be eradicated in a few 
years with military operations.  Kinetic operations are not the only way extremism should 
be stemmed. 
While shifting global demographics, the diffusion of technology, new power 
brokers, and unique methods of conflict are expected in the future security environment, 
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the third offset must also fulfill mainstays of U.S. strategy.  Indeed, there are certain 
predominant objectives that have endured as pillars of U.S. defense strategy since World 
War II.  These enduring objectives have weathered numerous administrations, leaders, 
budgets, and many other changes.  Most likely, regardless of external and internal 
pressures, the U.S. will remain a global power with global interests.  Therefore, the third 
offset must fulfill these enduring pillars. 
The key strategic mainstay of U.S. strategy is to deter aggression, and if 
deterrence fails to deny the adversarial objectives and ultimately defeat the enemy.  While 
the terms, “deter”, “deny” and “defeat” go through minor iterations depending on 
leadership, the principle is the same; confront aggression and secure American interests.  
The second foundational principle of U.S. strategy is to strengthen relationships with 
allies and partners.  A considerable piece of building and maintaining strong relationships 
comes from the U.S. forward deployed presence.  Forward deployed assets demonstrate 
U.S. commitment to allies and establishes the U.S. in a more advantageous position to 
achieve the first objective.  It is unrealistic to believe that these hallmarks will undergo 
drastic changes in the future.  Thus, the third offset must be geared toward ensuring these 
essential objectives. 
Less essential, but still foundational hallmarks of U.S. strategy, are to support the 
spread of democracy and maintain the All-Volunteer Force.  The U.S. has long supported 
emerging democracies and the desire to export democratic processes and ideology.  At 
least one unintended consequence of supporting democracies is that democracies can 
change orbits with the election of new leaders.  The U.S. is experiencing this in the 
Philippines.  As the U.S. supports the export of democracy, it must appreciate that the 
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strength of alliances can ebb and flow, but it must support the direction that the partner 
country has chosen.  It is an exercise in statecraft to demonstrate that even democratic 
nations can have differences but those differences are not drastic enough to engender 
violent conflict. 
In order to meet these hallmark objectives, the military outlines priority missions.  
These missions are to maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent, provide military 
defense for the homeland, defeat an adversary, provide a global stabilizing presence, 
combat terrorism, counter weapons of mass destruction, deny adversary objectives, 
respond to crisis, conduct military engagement and security cooperation, conduct stability 
and counterinsurgency operations, provide support to civilian authorities and finally, 
conduct humanitarian and disaster relief.138  Indeed, this is a litany of “priority” missions.  
In short, the U.S. military must be capable of conducting a multitude of missions, across 
the spectrum of threats. 
With a litany of diverse missions, the U.S. must be adaptable to changing 
situations and be prepared to conduct any mission around the globe.  To this end, the 
strategy documents state the U.S. should be capable of swift and decisive force 
projection.139  Many strategy documents delineate what the Joint Force should stress to 
accomplish swift and decisive force projection, to address priority missions, and to 
achieve essential objectives.  First, the Joint Force seeks the best and the brightest 
Americans for its ranks.140  Second, the U.S. seeks investments to counter anti-access and 
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area denial (A2AD) capabilities, space, cyber, and hybrid threats.141  These investments 
include, space and earth-based indications and warning systems, integrated and resilient 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, strategic lift platforms, long-range 
precision weapons, missile defense technology, undersea systems, remotely operated 
vehicles, special forces, and a Cyber Mission Force, among others.142 
One may notice that the two elements the Joint Force seeks closely align with the 
three thrusts of the third offset strategy.  The only thrust missing is the development of 
operational concepts.  These strategy documents, which were released after the unveiling 
of the third offset, show that the third offset is currently underway.  Indeed, the services 
are pursuing some incredible technologies geared toward alleviating impacts of the future 
security environment.  Many technologies and concepts are beginning to be tested and are 
close to fielding.  While similar to previous offsets in many ways, the third offset also has 
many unique attributes.  In addition, there are other endeavors that are being pursued in 
conjunction with the third offset to facilitate the implementation of the bold strategy.  
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THE THIRD OFFSET 
 
Introduction to the Third Offset 
To face the challenges of an uncertain and unpredictable future security 
environment, as well as, to address the dwindling U.S. technological advantage, the U.S. 
is pursuing a new strategy.  The third offset strategy is aimed with advancing cutting-
edge technologies for use in military applications, developing operational concepts to 
maximize the utility of cutting-edge technologies, and finally with retaining the best and 
brightest Americans for service in the U.S. military.  There is not one preeminent 
document that outlines and delineates the strategy in its entirety.  To the contrary, much 
of the information concerning the third offset comes from speeches and interviews with 
top Pentagon officials.  In addition, major tenets of the third offset strategy can be found 
in many key U.S. strategy documents.  Further, the services are actively pursuing new 
operational concepts while, researching, developing, and testing cutting-edge 
technologies.  The direction to move forward has been given and the strategy has 
permeated the U.S. military enterprise. 
Indeed, the three major thrusts of the strategy offer innovative ways to improve 
the military enterprise and enhance warfighting capabilities.  From the Navy’s 
electromagnetic railgun, with offensive and defensive applications, and advanced 
manufacturing like, 3-D printing, that has the potential to simplify the complexities of 
supply chains and logistics.  Both capabilities, and many others are cost effective 
breakthroughs that offer pioneering ways to ensure U.S. military dominance.  Operational 
concepts are utilizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems to augment the 
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human decision-making process.  Machine power augmenting human performance is 
believed to offer the greatest impact for the third offset period.143  In today’s 
interconnected world, the young men and women growing up with technology are 
tomorrow’s warfighters.  Therefore, efforts are in motion to recruit the next generation of 
technologically adroit warfighters. 
With a myriad of threats and a diverse range of operations, the third offset is not 
intended for one adversary but is intended to blunt multiple military competitors.  While 
still in its emergent stages, new technologies, warfighting concepts, and highly trained 
warriors are geared toward modernizing and leaning out the military.144  In addition, the 
strategy is not intended to fight future wars but to deter future conflict.  The Pentagon 
views the diminishing U.S. technological lead as a threat to U.S. deterrence.  Therefore, 
the purpose of the third offset is to develop these thrusts to maintain U.S. military 
superiority and ensure peace through a strong conventional deterrence. 
Moreover, this strategy is expected to be a continuous assessment and 
development.  The U.S. no longer expects to have a monopoly on a technological 
advantage for 40 years, thus, the third offset is focused on sustaining the technological 
lead in short-term increments of three to five years.145  This may seem like an 
unattainable development regimen for a bureaucratic morass like the Department of 
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Defense.  However, the organization has acknowledged its shortcomings, with regards to 
business practices, and the third offset strategy is part of a larger Department wide 
initiative.  Other initiatives and reforms in areas like, audits and procurement, are 
intended to support the third offset to reduce barriers and impediments. 
Truly, the third offset is an ambitious strategy and this section will begin by 
introducing the third offset and its three major aims.  In addition, this section will discuss 
some of the accompanying initiatives that are intended to strengthen the third offset.  This 
strategy has been liberated from the philosophical debate and has produced tangible 
results.  Therefore, this section will provide a brief overview of various undertakings for 
each aim. 
 
The Third Offset Strategy   
As mentioned above, much of the information that has been released concerning 
the third offset strategy has come from speeches, testimonies, and press releases from 
Pentagon leaders.  In addition, since the strategy is still in its early stages, it can be 
difficult to locate information outside Pentagon sources.  This offers benefits including, 
obtaining information directly from the source.  Of course, with only one avenue to glean 
information, at least one drawback is biasness.  Also, because the strategy is incipient, it 
is fluid and continues to take form.  Fluidity offers the Department of Defense the ability 
to adapt the strategy to pressures from the changing security environment and emerging 
security challenges. 
The third offset strategy was introduced in 2014 as part of a larger U.S. 
Department of Defense initiative.  Laid out in the keynote address before the Reagan 
 62 
National Defense Forum, former Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense 
Innovation Initiative.  The foremost goal of this initiative is to terminate the loss of the 
U.S. technological advantage to ensure the U.S. maintains a robust and effective 
conventional deterrence.  This extensive initiative is aimed with; 
1) Developing cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics, 
autonomous systems, miniaturization, analyzing big data, and advanced 
manufacturing, like 3-D printing. 
2) Exploring new operational concepts and approaches to warfighting by 
utilizing the cutting-edge technologies developed. 
3) Acquiring and retaining the best and brightest minds to pursue the previous 
objectives.146 
 
In short, technical innovation, coupled with the development of operational concepts and 
doctrine, will produce the third offset strategy.  According to the figurehead behind the 
third offset strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, the offset strategy 
utilizes U.S. advantages to offset, or undermine, adversarial advantages.147 
The third offset strategy is intended to address the long-term security of the U.S. 
by addressing current instabilities while simultaneously, planning and preparing for 
future threats and the future security environment.  In addition, the U.S. views adversarial 
advancements and modernizations as efforts to blunt the U.S. technological edge.  Both 
Russia and China are modernizing their military capabilities on a trajectory to become 
U.S. peers.  In addition, these modernizations can be thought of as an adversarial offset 
strategy aimed at undermining U.S. strengths, mainly U.S. technological superiority and 
expeditionary force projection.  The third offset is intended to respond to the “adversarial 
offset”. 
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The U.S. technological lead is dwindling and is best illustrated by outlining 
technologies, modernization regimes, and platforms that growing powers are seeking 
which include; advanced aircraft, submarines, longer range and more accurate cruise and 
ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles and counter space, cyber, and electronic warfare 
capabilities.148  Advanced aircraft, like the new Chinese fifth-generation fighter and the 
Russian fifth-generation fighter under development, are intended to weaken U.S. air 
supremacy.  In addition, China has christened five new Luyang-III class guided missile 
destroyers that carry its “carrier killer” missiles.149  Russia has recently deployed a new 
cruise missile, dubbed the SSC-X-8, that the U.S. contends violates the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.150  Longer range and more sophisticated ballistic and 
cruise missiles, like the Chinese “carrier killer” and the new Russian cruise missile, 
threaten the U.S. homeland and the U.S. forward presence to limit U.S. involvement 
during tense situations or a conflict. 
Another way U.S. adversaries are seeking to offset U.S. strengths is by targeting 
information and other electronic networks the U.S. utilizes in every operation.  In 
addition, the electronic and computer infrastructure are vulnerable to exploitation and a 
successful attack can undermine U.S. military effectiveness.151  Therefore, adversaries are 
developing and, in some instances, have already utilized, informationalized warfare 
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capabilities, like cyber-attacks.  Numerous examples abound from North Korea’s hack of 
Sony Pictures, to China’s theft of information from the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, to Russia’s Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Estonia in 
2007.  Cyberattacks and network intrusions are difficult to defend against because they 
materialize at the speed of light along fiber optic cables and are not confined by 
geographic or other physical boundaries.152  In addition, attribution of intrusions and 
attacks in cyberspace are complicated in that, the actor can easily obfuscate its location 
and conceal its motives.153 
Because U.S. adversaries are developing asymmetric capabilities in every domain, 
the U.S. must be prepared to conduct and combat operations across all domains; land, 
sea, air, space, and cyberspace.  Further, while the examples above pertained to states, 
today’s technologies are evolving rapidly, are no longer reserved for actors with defense 
infrastructures, and are easily accessible to a range of actors.154 
For the past forty years, the U.S. has held a monopoly on technologies that were 
developed during the second offset.  Many competitors have observed how the U.S. has 
utilized those technologies in operations and are seeking to emulate and implement those 
capabilities in their own military enterprise.  Further, because the use of such 
technologies has been optimized, adversaries have recognized advantages and 
weaknesses.  The well-established nature of the current suite of U.S. platforms, in 
military operations, gives adversaries insight to undermine the U.S. advantages.  
Although the use of U.S. platforms and capabilities is well-known, the third offset is not 
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solely about introducing new and expensive platforms.  A large element of the offset is to 
upgrade and integrate cutting-edge technologies into existing platforms, thus, creating 
new or enhanced capabilities.155 
The core issue with adversarial modernizations and development of asymmetric 
capabilities is the U.S. ability to conventionally deter adversaries and growing power 
states may be called into question.  Therefore, the Department of Defense views the 
dwindling U.S. technological edge as an erosion of the value associated with the U.S. 
conventional deterrent.156  Thus, it is an imperative that the U.S. respond with 
investments in innovation and reforms at present to maintain a lead ahead of any potential 
gains from an adversary.  The third offset is intended to give U.S. warfighters every 
advantage over potential enemies. 
Moreover, this strategy is expected to be a continuous assessment and 
development.  Again, the U.S. no longer expects to have a monopoly on a technological 
advantage for 40 years.  Thus, the third offset is focused on sustaining the technological 
lead in short-term increments.157  In explanation, the U.S. is seeking to implement the 
three aims to gain the operational advantage in the next three to five years.  Once that has 
been completed, the U.S. will begin anew to develop and implement innovations to 
ensure the advantage for the next period of years, and so on.  In the end, the U.S. is 
attempting to restrict its adversaries’ ability to compete by continually remaining at the 
forefront.  These short-term cycles are intended to have long-term ramifications. 
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To maintain a rapid cycle and lower obstacles to innovation, the third offset is 
accompanied by other Department of Defense programs directed to streamline Pentagon 
business practices.  In addition, the Pentagon has acknowledged that many of today’s 
cutting-edge technologies are developed outside the traditional defense apparatuses.  
Technological advances are occurring in the private sector for commercial uses.  To 
acquire these technologies, the Pentagon has increased investments outside the familiar 
defense companies.  Furthermore, to foster a greater collaborative relationship between 
the government and the technology industry, the Pentagon has opened outreach offices in 
Silicon Valley and in other burgeoning technology cities. 
 
Accompanying Initiatives 
The Defense Innovation Initiative is a department wide effort to identify and 
invest in ways to sustain and advance U.S. military dominance in the 21st Century.158  To 
this end, other reforms and innovations, outside technologies and operational concepts, 
are integral if the third offset is to succeed.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Cater 
explained, in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 2016 
Department of Defense Budget, the chief area where the military enterprise needs 
reforms are in its business practices.159 
To remain competitive Secretary Carter stated the Department of Defense needs 
to curb wasteful spending and be accountable for expenditures, as cost overruns hurt 
public trust.160  It may be difficult to believe but the Department of Defense has never 
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undergone a Department wide audit.  However, the National Defense Authorization Act 
of 2010 requires the Department to have its full financial statements audit-ready by 
September 30, 2017.161  According to a Department of Defense audit readiness document, 
the organization is continuing its efforts to meet this goal and audits have been 
instrumental in assisting the enterprise to review its business practices and management 
systems.162 
In addition to audits, programs like Better Buying Power are other initiatives the 
organization is pursuing to streamline and review and its business practices.  Better 
Buying Power, now in its third iteration since 2010, is a Department of Defense mandate 
“to do more without more.”163  It is intended to strengthen the Department of Defense’s 
buying power by implementing a series of reforms to control the costs of programs 
through competition, incentives, and curtailing the bureaucratic process.  Better Buying 
Power focuses on affordable programs, controlling costs throughout capability life-cycle, 
incentivizing productivity in government and industry, eliminating unnecessary and 
unproductive processes in the bureaucracy, promoting competition, and improving the 
professional and knowledge of the acquisition workforce.164  By controlling costs and 
reducing fraud, the Department of Defense can reallocate defense dollars to pressing 
challenges.  In addition, a mandate like Better Buying Power will ensure third offset 
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technologies and innovations reach the warfighter rapidly by reducing obstacles to 
acquisition.  Smooth acquisition cycles will be key if the third offset is to achieve short-
term development cycles and sustain with the quick pace of technological development. 
Technological developments are no longer occurring solely at the government 
level; many advances are occurring in the private sector for commercial use.  To remain 
competitive in the current development environment, the Department of Defense 
instituted its own start-up called the Defense Unit Innovation Experimental or, DUIx.  
According to its mission statement, the Unit is a bridge between those in the U.S. 
military, conducting national security missions, and companies operating on the cutting-
edge of technology.165  This Unit has locations in technology hubs like Silicon Valley, 
Boston, and Austin to be near private sector developers to accelerate technology into the 
hands of military warfighters.166  This outreach reinforces the third offset by enabling the 
organization to have access to developers producing cutting-edge technologies.     
In addition to outreach and business practice initiatives, the Department of 
Defense also wants more freedom in its fund allocation.  Congressional oversight is an 
important function, however, there are ways the Pentagon feels this relationship can be 
improved.  Most importantly, the Pentagon believes the Budget Control Act of 2011 
should be repealed.167  According to the Pentagon, unpredictable budgets and continuing 
resolution spending bills are detrimental to the enterprise overall and deleteriously impact 
the research and development portion of the budget on a greater scale.168  Also, the 
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Pentagon seeks another round of Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) because the 
organization is operating at 25% higher capacity than it needs.169  Another contentious 
issue is the retirement of aging platforms and capabilities.  For a number of years, the 
organization has been attempting to retire the A-10, however, Congress continues to fund 
the platform.  At the crux of this issue is the organization wants Congress to trust the 
Department of Defense that it is making the correct decision with respect to its base 
closures and retirement schedules.  Indeed, cutting overhead spending and retiring aging 
platforms would facilitate the third offset by funding the strategy’s aims and 
accompanying initiatives.   
 
Examining the Three Aims:  Cutting-Edge Tech, Operational Concepts, and 
Retention 
As outlined above, the third offset consists of three major aims.  The first aim is to 
develop cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics, autonomous 
systems, miniaturization, analyzing big data, and advanced manufacturing, like 3-D 
printing.  Certainly, many advancements in these fields have taken place in recent years.  
Although, the notable advancements in autonomous systems have been in the arena of 
operational concepts and will be discussed in more detail subsequently. 
Miniaturization is an interesting technology to examine because it entails more 
than producing smaller and more powerful computer chips.  A prime example of how 
miniaturization is being utilized can be found in the electromagnetic railgun system.  The 
electromagnetic railgun can hurl a 24-lb projectile, named the hypervelocity projectile 
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(HVP), at Mach 7 over 100 nautical miles, using solely electricity.170  In comparison to 
the Navy’s current deck gun, the HVP has over seven times the range and is three times 
faster and lighter.171  The railgun’s smaller and lighter rounds permit more projectiles to 
be stored on a ship when compared to conventional rounds.  Therefore, the HVP has the 
potential to increase space, a precious commodity aboard a vessel, for other capabilities 
and platforms.  In addition, the HVP is not a combustion round and relies solely on the 
speed of the projectile to destroy the target.172  This characteristic of the HVP minimizes 
the risk associated with storing the projectile.  Further, the electromagnetic railgun may 
upset the current missile defense quandary because of the inexpensiveness of each fire 
sequence when compared to the cost of current missile interceptors.  The prototypes are 
said to be capable of firing 10 rounds a minute at a meager cost of $25,000 per shot.173  
By comparison, the SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors cost between $12 million to $15 
million and the new interceptor, being developed between the U.S. and Japan, costs 
between $20 million and $24 million.174  Fast reloads and a deep magazine on the railgun 
grants increased shot opportunities on target at an affordable cost.  The railgun’s 
sustained firing may help to reduce the effectiveness of new sophistication techniques on 
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adversary’s ballistic missiles, like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles 
(MIRV) and salvo launches. 
The utility of 3-D printing, sometimes referred to as additive manufacturing, in 
future operations is straightforward.  Advanced manufacturing would simplify replacing 
lost, missing, or broken parts for equipment.  Ostensibly, it would greatly reduce the need 
for large inventories of spare parts.  In addition, additive manufacturing could reduce 
costs in a variety of ways.  With less need for physical warehouse and storage space, 
overhead dollars could be reallocated.  Additionally, the military could save on 
procurement by not spending large sums on storing parts that may never be used.  Having 
the ability to replace parts on a one-to-one and as needed basis would be a great benefit. 
In addition, additive manufacturing would simplify the supply chain and logistics, 
as well as, the costs of shipping parts.  An almost non-existent supply chain would assist 
units conducting missions in underdeveloped locales that lack an infrastructure.  Further, 
as a unit deploys it can leave non-essential replacement parts behind making the unit 
lighter for a more rapid force projection.  This innovative technology could transform 
military supply chain and logistics and the bureaucratic procurement process.  This 
technology is beginning to enter the military enterprise.  For example, an MV-22B 
Osprey flew a trial mission with a flight essential part fabricated by additive 
manufacturing.175  On a lower scale, an Air Force unit manufactured brackets to hang 
signs, using a 3-D printer, which lowered the cost of the bracket by 88%.176 
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At first sight, analyzing big data evokes notions about government spying 
programs.  In truth, major advances in analyzing large amounts of data could greatly 
increase U.S. intelligence and information gathering.  There is a wealth of information 
online and with the rapid sifting of data, the U.S. could glean valuable information about 
adversarial troop movements, training, and equipment.  This ability is predicated on the 
ubiquitous use of social media platforms by service members around the globe.  Further, 
there has been a demonstrated use of an algorithm that specifically followed social media 
profiles and created a timeline of flight MH17; the Malaysian passenger plane that was 
shot down over Ukraine in July 2014.177  This timeline sifted through open source social 
media platforms and found pictures of the plane taking off and a Russian SA-11 missile 
battery in the vicinity where MH17 was shot down, with all its missiles.  The next picture 
in the timeline revealed a contrail emanating from near the location of the Russian missile 
battery.  Another picture showed the same missile battery, confirmed by serial number, 
leaving the area and lastly, a picture of the SA11 battery entering Russian.178  While this 
does not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt Russian military involvement, it does 
demonstrate the value of intelligence gathering through social media platforms, and the 
utility of tracking adversarial movements through cyberspace. 
In addition, this type of sifting requires learning machines that can be taught to 
identify patterns and objects.  Until 2015, a human analyst was more effective at 
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identifying objects than a machine.179  Now machines can identify objects more 
accurately and more quickly than humans.  While big data analytics could be used to 
acquire, analyze, and distribute intelligence and information about an adversary, there are 
other practical applications.  Salvo ballistic missile launches are of concern for the U.S.  
With hundreds of enemy missiles incoming, big data would be able to track the trajectory 
of many missiles and use interceptors sparingly to destroy only the missiles that will 
harm friendly assets; not the missiles that may fall harmlessly into the ocean.180  
Learning machines that analyze large amounts of data takes advantage of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems.  These developments are also 
producing the primary operational concepts to result from the third offset thus far, like 
human-machine collaboration and teaming.  It is helpful to provide a quick overview of 
terms that are often applied to today’s emerging technology.  Autonomy is the delegation 
of a decision authority to an entity to act within specific parameters.181  An entity in the 
battlespace with autonomy can be a human or a computer.  However, no machine or 
human has full autonomy, considering orders are prescribed through the chain of 
command.  An autonomous capability means the entity (human or machine) can 
independently select an action, to accomplish goals, based on the entity’s knowledge and 
understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.182 
So-called “autonomous systems” utilize Artificial Intelligence, which is the 
capability of a computer to perform a task that is usually reserved for human 
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intelligence.183  In essence, by expanding the use of AI within machines, humans are 
ceding more tasks to machines.  Interestingly, learning machines and AI differ from 
robots because a robot is simply a machine that completes a determined and defined task, 
function, or duty.  It is not capable of autonomy or decision-making within its purview. 
Human-machine cooperation is guided by the idea that a human and computer 
team is more effective at solving problems than either a human or computer team alone.  
For example, in 2005, two amateur chess players, utilizing three computers, beat a cadre 
of Grand Champion human chess players and another cadre of supercomputers.184  In 
human-machine collaboration, the human is the strategic thinker and the computer 
processes information quickly and presents tactical options to the human for a decision.  
This hinges on allowing the humans and machines to individually do what they do best.  
The F-35 is a great example of human-machine collaboration.  The F-35 is best described 
as a flying computer; a network of sensors that analyzes and relays information and data 
to the pilot through the helmet.185   
Human-machine collaboration and teaming, or using autonomous systems not in 
isolation of humans but in tandem, are truly innovative concepts.  Previously, unmanned 
systems were remotely operated by humans and were slated to replace humans on the 
battlefield.  Now machines are designed to augment humans.  The position that machines 
or computers are not meant to supplant humans, but instead are designated to allow 
humans to make informed decisions quickly, is supported by Pentagon leadership.186  In 
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addition, one can begin to see the far-reaching effects of autonomy on almost every facet 
of the military enterprise.  From automated cyber response to autonomous underwater 
mine sweeping and a litany of other applications are described in the Defense Science 
Board’s study on autonomy.187  Delegating command authority to learning machines will 
greatly enhance the military enterprise.  Not only are the machines capable of rapid 
decision making if given autonomy, relying on autonomous systems will keep more 
service members out of harm’s way. 
A core belief of U.S. strategy, since World War II, has been that the U.S. military 
is technological savvy and has better-trained men and women in uniform.188  The 
Department of Defense realizes that in today’s competitive environment, U.S. 
technologies are subject to theft, intrusion, and duplication.  However, the U.S. 
warfighter is stressed by U.S. leaders as an asset that cannot be replicated by U.S. 
adversaries.  For these reasons, the third aim of the third offset strategy is to recruit and 
retain the best and brightest minds to pursue cutting-edge technologies and develop 
operational concepts.  To this end, Secretary of Defense Carter released his Force of the 
Future initiatives.  One of these initiatives is intended to foster new ideas and attract new 
people to the Department.  The corporate fellows program allows service members the 
opportunity to gain experience in the private sector, where the breakthroughs are 
occurring, to bring the ideas back to the organization.189  The idea is to increase the 
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Department’s exposure to the wealth of burgeoning technology.  A second effort of the 
Force of the Future is geared toward retention.  To this end, Secretary Carter 
implemented a standard 12-week maternity leave policy and increased access to child 
care and insurance.  Other efforts include flexibility to offer career incentives and 
allowing some experts to enter military service in mid-career capacities.190 
Another Force of the Future initiative involves ensuring there are an adequate 
knowledge base and workforce to support a more technologically focused military 
enterprise.191  For example, to strengthen the workforce, the U.S. is fostering a skilled 
base by increasing access and the allure of science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) educations.  This means investments and scholarships in STEM 
programs, at all levels of the U.S. education system, which the U.S. has been pursuing 
diligently within the last decade.  Once the Pentagon has fostered and acquired the best 
and brightest minds, it seeks to retain its personnel, in both its civilian and military ranks.  
Competitive benefits and career development are key to retaining a talented workforce. 
The Defense Innovation Initiative is department wide and seemingly encompasses 
every aspect of the military enterprise.  However, its full implementation is not a 
foregone conclusion.  The third offset faces many obstacles.  Some impediments like, 
funding and the bureaucratic process, are perennial issues that have plagued the 
enterprise for generations.  Other barriers like buy-in are as institutional as other 
obstacles.  However, the organization is attempting to address those issues.  Often 
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neglected is the implications and consequences the third offset may produce.  This should 
not be ignored because as the two previous offsets show, today’s efforts can have lasting 
ramifications on the enterprise for generations.  In addition, there are lingering questions 
that need to be resolved or examined.  Is now the correct time to pursue an offset 
strategy?  How much autonomy will the U.S. or an adversary give machines?  These and 
other questions, implications, and ramifications will be discussed in the next section.  
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ANALYZING THE THIRD OFFSET 
 
Introduction 
The self-awareness and zeal with which the Department of Defense is pursuing 
the third offset strategy are commendable.  Indeed, there have been numerous 
accomplishments and the enterprise has benefited from new technologies, emerging 
operational concepts, and the pursuit of other initiatives.  The Department of Defense is 
not ready to rest its laurels on these accomplishments and is continuing its efforts to 
maintain the U.S. technological advantage.  While many obstacles exist to the 
implementation of the strategy, the organization is undertaking significant efforts to 
overcome these major internal and external hindrances.  Three internal obstacles the 
Department of Defense can mitigate are funding, its business practices, and buy-in.  On 
the other hand, external factors, like rising near peers and the proliferation of advanced 
technologies, may be beyond U.S. control. 
Fundamentally it is important to answer whether this is the correct time to pursue 
such a strategy.  Is the U.S. advantage so undermined that it must resort to an offset at 
present?  The Department of Defense believes so and makes a compelling argument for 
its position.  On the other hand, naysayers will counter that the organization continually 
hypes threats to secure funding.  In addition, an argument can be made that threat 
forecasting is imperfect.  A counter argument to this point is that the U.S. has a duty to 
prepare for the future or witness its power and influence deteriorate.  This back and forth 
discourse is necessary for a democracy to ensure there is a balance between security and 
other aspects of American life. 
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Further, if one accepts the Pentagon position that it is prudent to pursue an offset 
at present, is the vision focused enough to be successful?  Indeed, it encompasses more 
than technology and builds upon lessons from previous offset strategies.  Most notable is 
this offset seems to be leaving nothing to chance.  During the second offset, training and 
doctrinal reforms burgeoned alongside advanced technology.  Although these 
developments occurred organically and independently of the LRRDPP, the reforms and 
technologies coalesced to form what is considered the second offset.  The third offset 
differs by rendering technology, concepts, and people as pillars of the same strategy and 
other dimensions, like business practices, are being overhauled to ensure the strategy 
transitions smoothly. 
It is important to note possible impacts, implications, and ramifications the third 
offset may have on the force, force structure, and other facets of the enterprise.  The 
historical look at the previous offsets shows there can be lasting ramifications and 
impacts.  Technologies like autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are viewed as 
offering the greatest benefit to the military enterprise at present.  In addition, the 
integration of technology within the military enterprise has far-reaching ramifications for 
the enterprise, U.S. allies, and society.  From interconnectedness to machines 
increasingly fulfilling human tasks.  But how far and how much autonomy is the U.S. 
willing to give machines?  Ultimately the answer to this question lies in the future 
security environment the third offset is intended to compete in and the enduring pillars of 
U.S strategy.  
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Obstacles the Third Offset Must Overcome 
Admittedly, the success of the third offset is not a guarantee and will depend on 
numerous factors.  Three major internal obstacles the third offset strategy must overcome 
are funding, business practices, and acceptance.  Funding is an uncertain and limiting 
factor to the success of any strategy and the previous administration’s Secretary of 
Defense acknowledged that the fiscal environment is a major hurdle for implementation 
of the third offset.192  However, the new Trump administration has taken a strong stance 
in support of funding and building the U.S. military enterprise and released a proposal to 
increase Defense spending by $54 billion next year.193 
In addition, the total Federal research and development (R&D) budget requested 
for FY 2017 was $152 billion.194  Of the total R&D budget requested, the Department of 
Defense was allocated 47.8%, or $71.44 billion.195  In addition, the FY 2016 budget 
authorized close to $70 billion for total Department of Defense R&D spending.  To 
further break down the FY 2016 budget, the more research oriented portion of the 
Department’s budget, which includes basic and applied research, as well as, advanced 
technology development, accounted for $2.3 billion, $5 billion and $5.7 billion, 
respectively.196  Further, two budget activities that authorize funds for new weapons and 
platforms, where an operational need has been determined and there is an acquisition 
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regime in place, like the Joint Strike Fighter, accounted for $14.3 billion and $12.8 
billion.197  Finally, the budget activity that allocates funds for the development of 
improvements to existing systems totaled $25.4 billion.198  These numbers show that the 
Department of Defense R&D budget and ostensibly, the third offset, is receiving 
significant funding.     
The second key obstacle to the implementation of the third offset is its business 
practices.  Return on investments, as well as, controls that ensure the funds are spent 
properly and efficiently are integral to show the organization is a trustworthy fiduciary.  
In addition, slashing wasteful spending produces the obvious benefit of more defense 
dollars for where funds are truly needed.  Defense program cost and schedule overruns 
have become the normal, however, if the short-term cycles outlined by the third offset is 
to succeed, a new standard must be instituted. 
Another area where the Department could improve its business practices is in 
procurement and acquisition.  Currently a bureaucratic labyrinth, procurement needs to 
be optimized to accomplish rapid fielding and integration of technologies, if the U.S. is to 
operate in short-term cycles.  Moreover, this obstacle must be addressed without delay to 
meet this requirement.  The Pentagon has acknowledged procurement as a limiting factor 
and is working to improve procurement with its Better Buying Power 3.0 program.  
However, this is the third iteration of this program and hopefully, the organization has 
addressed the shortcomings of its previous iterations. 
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The third obstacle that must be addressed is buy-in or acceptance of the third 
offset strategy.  Buy-in of the third offset must occur at all levels; from the U.S. 
President, to Congress, to military brass, to battlefield commanders.  With the 
administration, which introduced the third offset departed from the White House, the new 
administration will need to approve of the third offset strategy if the strategy is to survive.  
President Trump has affirmed his desire to build up the military, but it is unclear if he 
will continue with the third offset strategy.  In addition, the Trump administration has 
nominated a replacement for the brainchild of the strategy, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Work, with a top Boeing executive, Patrick Shanahan.199  During his tenure, 
Deputy Work did a great deal to support the strategy by constantly preaching its tenets at 
every opportunity to engrain the third offset in military leaders at all levels. 
Congress has a role in funding and accepting the strategy.  For example, if 
Congress does not approve phase-outs of older capabilities, new third offset technologies 
may not be fielded.  In addition, continued funding for obsolete capabilities may diminish 
the returns expected from the third offset investments.  Retiring aging capabilities and 
closing or shrinking bases can hurt a Congressman’s constituents.  However, the 
Department of Defense may offer to replace aging capabilities with third offset platforms 
to assuage a Congressman’s concerns.  In the end, Congress and the Department of 
Defense must work together to overcome their differences.        
Importantly, warfighters within the military will need to embrace the strategy.  
Not only must the warfighters embrace the game-changing capabilities, they will also 
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need to be trained, knowledgeable, and confident in third offset capabilities for the 
innovations to be fully exploited.  The fast pace of technological innovation creates a 
unique predicament for service members.  There may come a time when the tempo of 
technological advancement has outpaced a human’s ability to remain abreast of emerging 
technologies. 
Two glaring external obstacles the U.S. will face is the proliferation of technology 
and competition.  It would be a wasted effort for the U.S. to attempt to stem the spread or 
restrict access to emerging technologies.  First, the private sector is taking point on 
innovation, therefore, any attempts to check the proliferation of technology may stymie 
advancement.  Or with a restrictive stance, companies may decide not to work with the 
Pentagon.  Secondly, it does not seem likely that the U.S. could create an effective 
control regime.  There are countless outlets for the spread of technology and it would be 
difficult to stem a fraction of the avenues. 
Other actors are no longer sitting idle as the U.S. advances.  Currently, other 
power actors are attempting to undermine U.S. military superiority.  Because adversaries 
are undergoing extensive military modernizations and the U.S. no longer expects to have 
an advantage for 40 years, short-term innovation cycles are being pursued to stay ahead 
of adversarial gains.  However, commanding the technological advantage may be 
difficult to accomplish indefinitely.  The U.S. may want to begin to plan for a short 
period where it does not have the advantage.  Admittedly, addressing external factors are 
extremely difficult, but it was in response to external actors that the U.S. chose to pursue 
an offset strategy at present. 
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The Pentagon’s Case for a Third Offset 
The Pentagon deems it is relevant to pursue an offset at present and Deputy 
Secretary Work explained the reason in understandable terms.  As he relates the story, 
when Ash Carter took the helm at the Department of Defense, he asked Deputy Work and 
the Joint Chiefs how the next 25 years will differ from the previous 25 years.200  As they 
interpreted it, the security environment had undergone a momentous change at the end of 
2013.  The 25 years before December 2013, at no time in history, since the Peace of 
Westphalia created the modern nation state, had there been a period where one nation had 
accumulated so much national power without a worthy competitor.201  The nation that 
had accumulated preeminence was the U.S. and the event that led to its ascendancy as the 
sole superpower was the fall of the Soviet Union. 
For close to 25 years the U.S. had maintained a status far above adversaries and 
competitors.  However, in December 2013, China began the largest land reclamation 
effort ever undertaken, in the South China Sea.  In addition, a few months later, in 
February and March of 2014, Russia began its invasion and subsequent annexation of 
Crimea.  From these two events, Deputy Work and the Joint Chiefs determined that the 
next 25 years would see the rise of great power states.202  Further, an offset strategy was 
chosen because the U.S. had confronted a great power state during the Cold War and the 
U.S. had employed an offset strategy to confront the Soviet Union.203 
                                                 
200. U.S. Department of Defense, “Third Offset Strategy”. 
201. Ibid. 
202. Ibid. 
203. Ibid. 
 85 
The Pentagon’s case begs the question, are these life-changing events that require 
a new strategy?  This is a difficult question to discern.  Of course, Deputy Work and the 
Joint Chiefs could be incorrect in their prediction.  In addition, if the U.S. believes it will 
be facing growing power states should it forego naming humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief as priority military missions?  This way the U.S. is concentrated on 
confronting growing powers.  Further, President Eisenhower had an enlightening view 
concerning spending on endless contingencies.  However, this view may be less relevant 
as the U.S. seeks to contain growing powers.  Soft power operations can be vital to 
winning influence as the other states grow.  For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the 
Pentagon will change these designations now, but it may need to in the future.  While 
threat forecasting is difficult, it seems the U.S. can expect the growing power states of 
Russia and China to continue their individual quest for ascendancy.  Indeed, there has 
been a growing number of incidents since 2013 with Russian nuclear bombers entering 
NATO airspace and Russian pilots buzzing U.S. ships.  Further, Russia seems to have 
inserted itself into the Syrian Civil War to ensure that any peace that is mediated includes 
Moscow’s influence. 
There were many ways the U.S. could address growing power states.  However, it 
chose an offset strategy because it had been successful in the past.  The third iteration of 
the offset strategy is similar to its forerunners, although, the third offset has many unique 
aspects.  Importantly the third offset has built upon its predecessors.  Both the second and 
third offset learned from the New Look that it was imprudent for the U.S. to pursue a sole 
capability and emphasize a singular platform to deliver the capability.  During the second 
offset, training and doctrinal reforms burgeoned alongside advanced technology.  
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Although these developments occurred organically and independently of the LRRDPP, 
the reforms and technologies coalesced to form what is considered the second offset.  The 
third offset differs by rendering technology, concepts, and people as pillars of the same 
strategy.  In addition, other dimensions of the enterprise are being overhauled to ensure 
the strategy is implemented smoothly. 
To characterize the third offset as a technology-centric strategy is both correct and 
misinformed.  Technology is the guiding principle, but it is people, concepts and other 
reforms that will bolster the use and introduction of new technologies.  Similarly, it is 
people, concepts, and reforms that will be transformed by technology.  Truly, it is 
impossible to differentiate one as more important.  The brilliance of the third offset is that 
it is taking a comprehensive view of the entire enterprise to make itself ready for the 21st 
Century power competition.  While the third offset in is the inchoate stages, what is clear 
is if the strategy is implemented and the intended outcome is produced, the third offset 
will have many implications and impacts on policy, strategy, and force structure. 
 
Predictions, Impacts, and Implications 
The third offset will have many implications and impacts on policy, strategy, and 
force structure.  For example, as the U.S. transfers more responsibilities to machines, 
troops numbers will most likely decrease and the composition of units will change as the 
units acquire new technologies.  In addition, with the growing use of autonomous 
systems, there is a new dimension to the ethics and conduct of war.  It is important to take 
note of possible impacts, implications, and ramifications the third offset may produce 
because, as the historical record demonstrates, offset strategies have the potential for 
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enduring ramifications.  Couple the short cycles with the astounding rate of technological 
growth and the U.S. will have less time to adapt to changes and mitigate difficulties.  For 
this reason, the U.S. must begin a thorough review of outcomes to prevent surprise. 
Even though new technologies and concepts are meant to augment humans, the 
introduction of more advanced technologies has implications for troop levels and force 
structure.  Even though humans are not being replaced, there will be less need for humans 
as autonomous platforms are fielded.  Therefore, it can be predicted that as autonomous 
systems proliferate, the overall number of humans in the military enterprise will decrease.  
This will hold true for combat, non-combat, and civilian roles and numbers. 
Evidence for this claim is supported by platforms like DARPA’s unmanned 
vessels and the Army’s Grey Eagle program.  DARPA recently released an unmanned 
vessel designed to track submarines.  In addition, a primary of objective of this unmanned 
surface vessel is that a human is never intended to board this vessel at any point during its 
operating cycle.  Moreover, the autonomous operating system is intended to operate 
independently for months with little remote supervisory control.204 
The prediction that fewer troops will be needed in noncombat roles can be 
concluded because platforms are currently being designed to operate without humans, 
during its operating cycle, and operate independently for long periods without human 
control.  Therefore, fewer humans will be needed to operate non-combat capabilities as 
those responsibilities are turned over to machines.  This point is further supported by 
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DARPA's admission that its vessel is to be fabricated to do without human maintenance 
during its life operating cycle.  Subsequently, fewer service members will be needed to 
perform maintenance on autonomous technologies.  In addition, with the majority of 
technological advancements occurring outside the military, there is less need for the 
enterprise to employ civilians to perform this function.   
In addition to requiring fewer members in non-combat specialties, the U.S. 
military will also require fewer members in combat roles.  Evidence for this claim can be 
found in the U.S. Army's Grey Eagle program.  The Army’s machine teaming operational 
concept utilizes its Apache helicopters to fly missions with autonomous aircraft, called 
the Grey Eagle.  The autonomous vehicles will act as external extensions of the 
helicopter.205  Therefore, fewer helicopters and subsequently, fewer pilots, will be needed 
to achieve missions.  Further, the force structure of those units will change.  The number 
of aircraft in each unit will decrease, while the number of autonomous vehicles attached 
to each unit will increase.  If the same numbers of aircraft remain operational through 
these changes, there may be an increase in the total number of helicopter units throughout 
the Army's force structure.  The possible increase in helicopter units without the need to 
increase the number of helicopters would be a positive development.  This could mean 
the U.S. may be able to increase its forward presence abroad, in places like Europe, to 
confront Russia's increasing aggression. 
While the above example centered on the Grey Eagle project, it is not hard to 
extrapolate this example to the integration of autonomous platforms alongside other 
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capabilities and expect similar results.  Whether alongside U.S. Navy ships, or Marines, 
autonomous entities will enhance human and platform performance with reduced troop 
numbers, with the intention, that the overall military effectiveness increases. 
So far the human discussion has concentrated on troop numbers and force 
structure.  However, there is another piece to the human element that is worth 
mentioning.  The members of the future force will need to be highly capable and 
adaptable.  The platforms that the men and women will be operating will take extensive 
training and intelligence to operate.  Further, technologies will be constantly changing 
and progressing.  Even though machines will assist the human in decision making, the 
human ultimately decides the course of action.  Therefore, the services will require 
people with good judgment and decisiveness.  Because the future force will require 
people of the highest caliber and ability, one can expect the Department of Defense to 
increase pay, bonuses, and benefits for the future generation of warfighters.  Additionally, 
because familiarization with third offset technologies, platforms, and concepts will 
require extensive study, the Department of Defense may look to extend the time of 
military occupation schools.  Moreover, because initial training time may be increased, 
the military should examine the feasibility of increasing initial enlistment contracts.  
Training time will most likely increase unless the enterprise can rely on STEM 
investments to train its workforce before they arrive at initial training.  It may be best for 
the enterprise to recruit trained men and women before they are hired. 
There are ramifications of a smaller U.S. military and a more technologically 
educated warfighter on American society.  First, it is important to recognize that with 
fewer positions in the military, some Americans willing to serve their country may be 
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excluded.  In addition, the available positions may become extremely competitive.  While 
STEM investments are important to train a workforce, they are also important so 
Americans of all backgrounds and educations have the option to serve.  Second, it may 
seem futuristic and implausible, but it is important that the military enterprise does not 
become an exclusive cadre of elite troops.  As fewer Americans become involved in the 
military, due to openings, this means fewer Americans will have a personal connection to 
a service member.  This could create an environment where the troops who serve are 
removed from American society.  In addition, it is important that a diverse range of 
Americans serve so every sector of the American population is represented.  This will 
ensure leaders are held accountable for future military operations.  In the end, while 
machines will increasingly assist humans in military operations, humans will continue to 
be present in combat environments.  Technology may limit and reduce human exposure 
to warfare, but the human element will continue to experience the realities of warfare. 
In addition to the changes at the human level, the third offset has implications for 
U.S. policy and strategy.  U.S. adversaries, especially China, are developing asymmetric 
capabilities aimed at denying the U.S. the freedom to intervene and navigate Pacific 
waters in the event of a dispute with the U.S.  At the crux of the Chinese A2AD strategy 
is the modernization and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal.  Chinese ballistic 
missiles are intended to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers and coerce a limited response.  
Moreover, multiple countries, including numerous U.S. allies, dispute Chinese land 
reclamation efforts in the South China Sea.  One could see how an autonomous vessel, 
capable of continuously operating, could conduct freedom of navigation missions to 
refute Chinese claims in the South China Sea and bolster America’s presence and 
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commitment.  Although a caveat to utilizing autonomous vehicles to refute Chinese 
claims is that autonomous vehicles may not have standing to refute claims within 
international law. 
Technologies like the electromagnetic railgun will allow the U.S. Navy the 
freedom to navigate and operate in the Pacific.  If fielded the railgun’s fast and 
inexpensive rounds will ensure the U.S. cannot be coerced by Chinese ballistic missiles.  
Not only could the railgun protect against Chinese missiles, the railgun’s inexpensive 
rounds and directed energy weapons could liberate the U.S. from the ballistic missile 
interceptor quandary.  Both the railgun and directed energy weapons offer the U.S. an 
opportunity to change the asymmetric nature of missiles and interceptors by putting the 
cost burden on actors who would choose to employ ballistic missiles.  Furthermore, when 
coupled with the human-machine collaboration, the railgun and directed energy weapons 
could effectively defeat salvo missile launches.  The machine could quickly relay the 
coordinates and trajectories of salvo launch missiles and inform the human of which 
missiles have the potential to cause the most damage or harm, and which may fall 
harmlessly into the ocean. 
The previous examples illustrate the third offset’s possible effect on weighty 
defense issues like the U.S. rebalance to Asia and countering ballistic missiles.  However, 
the third offset has implications for soft operations like drones capable of delivering 
humanitarian assistance to regions that are otherwise inaccessible due to a disease 
outbreak or a natural disaster.  Supplies could include water, food, and medicine or even 
a portal advanced manufacturing station so an affected population can rebuild.  Not only 
would this prevent the U.S. from putting its troops at risk, it also ensures the U.S. military 
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fulfills its responsibilities and demonstrates U.S. resolve to confront instabilities at all 
levels.  Other soft power operations may include sharing technology with allies and 
partners to establish goodwill and bolster security.  Also, by embracing a technologically 
advanced economy, the U.S. can maintain its economic strength to encourage 
partnerships and hedge against growing powers.    
Importantly, these examples indicate that the third offset will impact U.S. 
relationships.  The U.S. may look to allies to fulfill niche roles or support smaller and 
agiler militaries that can absorb innovation more rapidly, to make modernizations the 
U.S. cannot.  Possible changes in force structures may allow the U.S. to continue and 
possibly increase its forward presence.  This would demonstrate the enduring U.S. 
commitment to its allies and partners.  Further, to U.S. adversaries, the third offset will 
indicate the U.S. will not resign itself to accept a dwindling U.S. technological lead.  
Instead, the U.S. will rise to challenge and adapt to changing circumstances to guarantee 
the U.S. remains a global power. 
It is beyond the best prognosticator’s ability to predict the effect that the third 
offset will have on the Department of Defense budget.  However, it will be interesting to 
witness the effect the third offset will have on large, expensive traditional platforms like 
the Air Force’s Long Range Strike Bomber and the U.S. Navy’s Ohio Class Replacement 
submarine.  These large platforms may become obsolete and the U.S. may transition to 
smaller platforms that interact with autonomous vehicles.  Or these large platforms may 
become a type of queen bee to a vast swarm of autonomous vehicles.206 
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On a final note, the third offset has the potential to introduce a new element to the 
ethics and conduct of war.  Currently, the U.S. maintains that a human will always be the 
final decision maker in any situation where a human life can be taken.207  Vehicles like 
DARPA’s vessel and the Grey Eagle project are intended to augment the human and do 
not have the authority to take a human life.  However, it is not difficult to believe that one 
day these autonomous extensions may have the capability to protect U.S. lives by taking 
enemy lives.  At what point will the U.S. allow independent vehicles a license to kill?  
While the U.S. remains adamant that the human should be the final decision maker when 
it comes to taking lives, this does not mean that U.S. adversaries will have the same 
beliefs.  How will the U.S. respond?  Currently, this dimension has more questions than 
answers. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The first offset strategy was the Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy 
that strove to offset Soviet conventional strength with U.S. nuclear and atomic 
technological superiority.  The New Look placed importance on the U.S. strategic arsenal 
deliverable by airpower to deter Soviet aggression and prevent escalation.  In addition to 
the strategic arsenal, the U.S. Army developed and devised doctrine, as well as, 
battlefield nuclear and atomic weapons to fight and sustain in a nuclear environment.  
U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, was viewed by the 
Eisenhower administration as a way to achieve deterrence at a bearable cost.  The idea of 
cost effective deterrence was predicated on President Eisenhower’s personal beliefs that a 
robust economy was the foundation of a strong foreign policy and profligate defense 
spending would undermine American freedom and liberties. 
The New Look was a practical and principled strategy that was tailored to address 
threats within the limits of the Eisenhower administration’s outlook.  In addition, the 
New Look resulted in the development of the U.S nuclear arsenal, including the nuclear 
triad, that continues to be a mainstay of U.S. strategy today.  Not only does the nuclear 
arsenal serve in defense of the U.S., but in the case of extended deterrence, the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal has built relationships with allies and partners around the globe, while 
simultaneously stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  The development of the 
nuclear arsenal during the New Look period offers an important insight concerning the 
far-reaching and enduring ramifications that such strategies can impart.  While the U.S. 
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relied on its nuclear arsenal to offset Soviet conventional strength in the 1950s, the U.S. 
advantage in nuclear weapon technology was fleeting.     
After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1973, the U.S. pivoted its 
attentions to the increasing Soviet threat and possible conflict in Central Europe.  There 
was a growing uneasiness over the U.S. ability to deter Soviet military action due to 
Soviet conventional and nuclear modernizations, both quantitively and quantality.  The 
prevailing thought was that with nuclear parity, which was achieved in the early 1970s, as 
well as conventional numerical and qualitative superiority, the Soviets would no longer 
be deterred from a conventional invasion of Central Europe. 
The second offset strategy is considered the period, from the early 1970s through 
the 1980s, when the U.S. pursued investments in precision guided munitions, long 
range/stealth aircraft, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms which 
would serve as force multipliers to upset the Soviet-U.S. imbalance.  Unlike the first 
offset period, that is clearly defined by the New Look, the second offset cannot be 
attached to one administration or condensed to a sole strategy.  On the contrary, the 
second offset spanned twenty years and included multiple administrations and Pentagon 
leaders.  In addition, while the New Look relied on the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal for 
security, the second offset sought to bolster conventional deterrence by outfitting 
platforms and weapons with over the horizon technologies.  Over the horizon 
technologies served to increase battlefield awareness, capability, depth, and scope to 
make U.S. conventional platforms more accurate while simultaneously reducing 
collateral damage and fratricide. 
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Crucial to the success of the second offset was the transformation of U.S. military 
doctrines, warfighting concepts, and training that took place after the Vietnam War.  
These military doctrines accompanied a focused shift in U.S. military strategy away from 
a counterinsurgency type conflict in Vietnam War to confronting and deterring the Soviet 
threat.  The development of the AirLand Battle doctrine by TRADOC in 1982 exploited 
the overlapping suite of technologically advanced capabilities and platforms that were 
beginning to come to fruition; most notably the Army’s Big Five.  In addition to military 
doctrines, the U.S. military transformed into an All-Volunteer Force while at the same 
time boosting military training.  National Training Centers and training programs like 
Topgun granted the U.S. the opportunity to obtain tactical and technical proficiency 
before actual engagement with the enemy.  In the end, the efficiency, effectiveness, and 
awareness of technologically advanced platforms were compounded with augmented 
training and doctrinal transformations. 
The U.S. is currently pursuing its third iteration of the offset strategy in response 
to a strategic inflection point characterized as growing great powers capable of 
challenging U.S. power, the unpredictable security environment where the U.S. seeks to 
address a host of contingencies from general war to humanitarian assistance and finally, 
as a response to an erosion of the U.S. technological lead.  Per the Pentagon, an offset 
strategy was chosen based on its historical utility to offset Soviet military strength during 
the Cold War.  The third offset strategy is aimed with advancing cutting-edge 
technologies for use in military applications, developing operational concepts to 
maximize the utility of cutting-edge technologies, and finally with retaining the best and 
brightest Americans for service in the U.S. military.  In addition, the third offset strategy 
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is a Department wide effort and includes other programs to reduce internal barriers the 
third offset faces. 
In the third offset, technology is the guiding principle, but it is people, concepts 
and other reforms that will bolster the use and introduction of new technologies.  
Similarly, it is people, concepts, and reforms that will be transformed by technology.  
Truly, it is impossible to differentiate one as more important.  The brilliance of the third 
offset is that it is taking a comprehensive view of the entire enterprise to make itself 
ready for the 21st Century power competition. 
According to the U.S. 2015 National Military Strategy, the U.S. currently faces 
multiple and simultaneous security challenges from many threat actors with a wide array 
of capabilities.208  This has created a security environment that is complex and prone to 
rapid changes.  These rapid changes are fueling the future security environment and 
factors such as demographic shifts, globalization, altering power dynamics, and the 
diffusion of technology are indeed shaping a security environment not seen in 25 years.  
Demographic shifts mean the future security environment will consist of a growing and 
more urbanized global population.  Military interventions and operations will 
increasingly occur near urban centers as the populations and thus, power centers, shift to 
sprawling urban areas.  Conducting military operations in urban environments creates 
unique challenges.  For example, discerning between combatants and noncombatants in 
large urban areas will become more difficult.  In addition, collateral damage must not 
only be minimized but may become a liability as the interconnectedness through 
globalization and technology means that military actions will be broadcast throughout the 
                                                 
208. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, i. 
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world in a matter of seconds.  Here, the development of A.I. and autonomous systems 
that can sift through large quantities of data and sufficiently identify combatants and 
legitimate targets is needed for future operations.  The third offset development of such 
capabilities seems promising to address this element of the future security environment.    
The spread of technology and the rapid pace at which technological innovation is 
occurring is blinding.  What is created today is obsolete tomorrow and in some cases, 
sooner.  There will come a time when the U.S. must decide when to field a capability that 
may not have the most current technology.  Because the rate of innovation is rapid, 
continually waiting for the next iteration of technology could jeopardize readiness and 
produce costly contract budget overruns.  Therefore, the U.S. must execute upgrades 
when funds and time are available.  Additionally, the U.S. government no longer has the 
monopoly on technological innovation.  Technological advancements today are occurring 
in the private sector for commercial use.  Therefore, the U.S. defense enterprise must 
solicit the private sector for new technologies and tailor those technologies to meet its 
requirements.  For this reason, the Department of Defense launched the DUIx unit in 
various technology hubs throughout the U.S.  Not only is this a promising avenue for the 
acquisition of new technologies, but it may serve as a method to recruit bright individuals 
from the private sector to the defense enterprise.     
Further, U.S. adversaries are developing unique ways to undermine U.S. power by 
introducing methods of warfare like A2AD capabilities, lawfare, and hybrid conflict.  
Again, third offset technologies and operational concepts are geared toward addressing 
these challenges; from the Navy’s railgun that may upset the ballistic missile defense cost 
dilemma to continuously operating unmanned systems that may help to overturn China’s 
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claims in the South China Sea.  In addition, with the advent of advanced manufacturing, 
the logistic barriers to confronting threats around the globe will be reduced. 
  If the defense enterprise implements the third offset the force of the future will 
look starkly different from today.  While planning and preparing for the future is crucial, 
it is also imperative the U.S. not neglect the present security challenges.  In contrast, 
foregoing the future for present challenges and operations can jeopardize the U.S. 
readiness and ability to address future challenges and threats.  The best way forward is to 
balance present requirements and future needs to maximize both the present and future 
force.  Balancing these constraints will be difficult and risks will need to be minimized to 
short-term and long-term capabilities, but it is important that neither the long- nor short-
term readiness is lacking. 
On a final note, it is important the defense enterprise not morph into an exclusive 
body comprised of an elite cadre of tech warfighters that are removed from American 
society.  As machines are expected to replace humans in the private and commercial 
sector, one can assume this will also hold true for military jobs.  STEM investments are 
important not only to train capable individuals to fill the ranks but to offer the 
opportunity for every American citizen the chance to serve his or her country. 
Indeed, the third offset is underway and is geared toward operating in the future 
security environment.  As Secretary of Defense Brown would later reflect on the second 
offset period and say “The Carter Administration initiated and developed these programs, 
the Reagan Administration paid for their acquisition in many cases and the…Bush 
Administration employed them.”209  If the past is any indication of the future, the Obama 
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administration set the strategic guidance for the third offset and it seems that the Trump 
administration will increase military spending to pay for the development of the third 
offset.  In the end, if implemented, the third offset strategy will produce technologies and 
operational concepts the next President can utilize if deterrence fails. 
 101 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BAE Systems.  “MK 45 Naval Gun System”.  2012.  http://www.baesystems.com 
/product/BAES_020039/mk-45-mod-4-naval-gun-system?_afrLoop=492700336 
7985000&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#!%40%40%3F_afrWindow
Id%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D4927003367985000%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%
26_adf.ctrl-state%3D17onrbbnyf_222. 
 
Carter, Ash. “The Next Two Links to the Force of the Future”.  United States Department 
of Defense Memorandum.  June 9, 2016.   http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/f 
eatures/2015/0315_force-of-the-future/Memorandum-The-Next-Two-Links-to-
the-Force-of-the-Future.pdf. 
 
Chapman, Anne, Carol Lilly, John Romjue and Susan Canedy.  Prepare the Army for 
War:  A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-
1998.  Fort Monroe, VA:  Military History Office, 1998.  http://www.tradoc.army 
.mil/Historian/docs/prepArmyForWarChp1_10%20.pdf. 
 
Clunan, Anne and Kirsten Rodine-Hardy.  “Nanotechnology in a Globalized World:  
Strategic Assessments of an Emerging Technology”.  Naval Postgraduate School.  
June 2014.  https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36735318.pdf. 
 
Converse, Elliot.  History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense: Rearming for the 
Cold War, 1945-1960 Vol. 1.  Washington, DC:  Historical Office; Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2012.  http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/ 
acquisition_pub/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol1.pdf?ver=2014-05-28-103257-
540. 
 
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental.  “Accelerating Innovation for National Defense”.  
Accessed February 12, 2017.  https://www.diux.mil/. 
 
Defense Science Board.  Summer Study on Autonomy.  June 2016.  http://www.acq.osd. 
mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSBSS15.pdf. 
 
DeSimone, Laura.  Aegis BMD; The Way Ahead.  Defense Technical Information Center.  
December 6, 2011.  http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011PEO/DeSimone.pdf.  
 
Dulles, John.  “The Evolution of Foreign Policy.”  The Department of State Bulletin 
XXX, no. 761, (January 25, 1954) : 107-110. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ 
pt?id=msu.31293008121345;view=1up;seq=110. 
 
Dunlap, Charles.  “Lawfare Today: A Perspective”.  Yale Journal of International 
Affairs.  Winter 2008: 146-154.  http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/01/083111dunlap.pdf. 
 102 
Eisenhower National Historic Site.  “Quotable Quotes of Dwight D. Eisenhower”.  
Accessed January 21, 2016.  https://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/ 
quotes2.htm. 
 
Gady, Franz-Stefan.  “China Commissions New ‘Carrier Killer’ Warship”.  The 
Diplomat.  January 24, 2017.  http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/china-
commissions-new-carrier-killer-warship/. 
 
Garrity, Patrick.  “A New Look at the New Look”.  Claremont Institute.  December 14, 
2012.  http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/a-new-look-at-the-new-look/. 
 
GlobalSecurity.org.  “CV-59 Forrestal Class”.  Accessed April 3, 2017.  http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/cv-59.htm. 
 
Gordon, Michael.  “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump”.  
The New York Times.  February 14, 2017.  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/ 
world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html?_r=0. 
 
Grant, Rebecca.   “The Second Offset”.  Air Force Magazine.  July 2016.  http://www. 
airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2016/July%202016/The-Second--
Offset.aspx. 
 
Hagel, Chuck.  “Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote Address”.  United States 
Department of Defense.  November 15, 2014.  http://www.defense.gov/News/ 
Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606635. 
 
Hernandez, Daniel.  “History of the Nuclear Navy”.  Stanford University.  February 22, 
2015.  http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/hernandez1/. 
 
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.  “Harold Brown:  James Carter 
Administration”.  Accessed February 1, 2017.  http://history.defense.gov/ 
Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571287/harold-brown/. 
 
Hopkins, J.C. and Sheldon Goldberg.  The Development of Strategic Air Command, 
1946-1976. 1976.  http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a060394.pdf. 
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 
2015.   http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_ 
Military_Strategy.pdf. 
 
Kagan, Frederick.  Finding the Target:  The Transformation of American Military Policy.  
New York, NY:  Encounter Books, 2006. 
 
Kugler, Richard.  Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs:  New Methods for a New 
Era.  Washington, DC:  National Defense University Press, 2006.  https://www. 
hsdl.org/?view&did=481962. 
 103 
Leighton, Richard.  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy, Money, 
and the New Look, 1953-1956 Vol. 3, Edited by Alfred Goldberg.  Washington, 
DC:  Historical Office; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010.  http://history. 
defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/secretaryofdefense/OSDSeries_Vol3.pdf. 
 
Littlefield, Scott.  “Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned 
Vessel”.  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.  Accessed January 8, 
2017.  http://www.darpa.mil/program/anti-submarine-warfare-continuous-trail-
unmanned-vessel. 
 
Lockie, Alex.  “Trump Just Nominated a Top Boeing Executive to be Mattis’ Second-In-
Command”.  Business Insider.  March 16, 2017.  http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
trump-nominate-patrick-shanahan-boeing-defense-2017-3. 
 
McConnell, Jerry.  “Polaris:  A Success Story”.  All Hands.  September 1960: 2-9.  
http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/archpdf/ah196009.pdf. 
 
Meilinger, Phillip.  Bomber:  The Formation and Early Years of Strategic Air Command.  
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:  Air University Press, 2012. http://www.au.af.mil/ 
au/aupress/digital/pdf/book/b_0127_meilinger_bomber.pdf, 295-302. 
 
Miller, David.  Defense 2045:  Assessing the Future Security Environment and 
Implications for Defense Policymakers.  Lanham, MD:  Rowman & Littlefield, 
2015.  https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/ 
publication/151106_Miller_Defense2045_Web.pdf 
 
MQ-1C Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System”.  ASC.Army.Mil.  Accessed January 8, 
2017.  http://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/aviation_gray-eagle-uas/. 
 
National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National 
Security.  A 21st Century Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for 
America’s National Security.  May 2016.  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/national_security_s_and_t_strategy.pdf. 
 
“NIE -3/8-76:  Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s”.  
December 15, 1976.  https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_ 
0000498605.pdf. 
 
Nottberg, Tyler.  “Once and Future Policy Planning:  Solarium for Today.” Eisenhower 
Institute at Gettysburg College.  Accessed April 1, 2016.  http://www. 
eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot. 
 
Office of Naval Research.  “Electromagnetic Railgun”.   Accessed December 20, 2017.  
http://www.onr.navy.mil/media-center/fact-sheets/electromagnetic-railgun.aspx. 
 
 104 
O’Rourke, Ronald.  Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile:  Background 
and Issues for Congress.  Congressional Research Service.  March 17, 2017.  
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44175.pdf. 
 
PBS News Hour.  “Types of Nuclear Bombs”.  May 2, 2005.  http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/updates/military-jan-june05-bombs_05-02/. 
 
Pellerin, Cheryl.  “Work Details the Future of War at Army Defense College”.  DoD 
News, Defense Media Activity.  April 8, 2015.  http://www.defense.gov/News-
Article-View/Article/604420. 
 
Sargent, John, Robert Esworthy, Laurie Harris, Judith Johnson, Jim Monke, Daniel 
Morgan and Harold Upton.  Federal Research and Development Funding:  
FY2017.  Congressional Research Service.  January 27, 2017.  https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R44516.pdf. 
 
Schnabel, James and Robert Watson.  History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and National Policy Volume III, 1951-1953, Part Two, The Korean 
War.  Washington, DC:  Office of Joint History, 1998.  http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/doctrine/history/jcs_nationalp3b.pdf.  193-219. 
 
Schwartz, Stephen.  “The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons”.  Nuclear Threat Initiative.  
October 1, 2008.  http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/costs-us-nuclear-weapons/. 
 
Shear, Michael and Jennifer Steinhauer.  “Trump to Seek $54 Billion Increase in Military 
Spending”.  The New York Times.  February 27, 2017.  https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-budget-military.html?_r=0. 
 
Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman.  Cybersecurity and Cyberwar:  What Everyone Needs 
to Know.  New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Stewart, Richard.  American Military History:  The United States Army in a Global Era, 
1917-2008, Volume II.  Washington, DC:  Center of Military History, 2010.  
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30-22/CMH_Pub_30-22.pdf 
 
Toomey, Christopher.  “Army Digitization:  Making it Ready for Prime Time”.  
Parameters.  Winter 2003/2004: 40-53. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ 
pubs/parameters/Articles/03winter/toomey.pdf. 
 
Trask, Roger and Alfred Goldberg.  The Department of Defense 1947-1997, Organization 
and Leaders.  Washington, DC:  Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997.  
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA330985. 
 
Trybula, David.  “’Big Five’ Lessons for Today and Tomorrow”.  Institute for Defense 
Analyses.  May 2012.  http://www.benning.army.mil/Library/content/NS%20P-
4889.pdf 
 105 
Tsirbas, Marina.  “What Does the Nine-Dash Line Actually Mean?”.  The Diplomat.  
June 2, 2016.  http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-
actually-mean/. 
 
United States Cryptologic History.  The Soviet Land-Based Ballistic Missile Program, 
1945-1972, An Historical Overview.  https://www.archives.gov/files/ 
declassification/iscap/pdf/2010-005-doc2.pdf. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense.  “3-D Printing:  Manufacturing Made Easy”.  Department 
of Defense Videos.  1:11.  Accessed February 20, 2017.  https://www.defense. 
gov/Video?videoid=498885. 
 
---.  “About the Department of Defense (DOD)”.  Defense.gov.  January 27, 2017.  
https://www.defense.gov/About. 
 
---.  Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan Status Report.  Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer.  May 
2016.  http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fiar/FIAR_Plan_ 
May_2016.pdf. 
 
---.  Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.   http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_ 
Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
 
---.  Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to Congress on the FY 1978 
Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY1978-1982 Defense Programs.  
Historical Office, of the Secretary of Defense.  January 17, 1977.  http://history. 
defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1978_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014
-06-24-150750-460.   
 
---.  Secretary of Defense Ash Carter Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the FY 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Defense.   
March 3, 2015.   http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/ 
20150303SenateArmedServicesCommitteeSECDEFBudgetTestimony.pdf. 
 
---.  Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s Annual Defense Department Report, FY 
1973.  Historical Office, of the Secretary of Defense.  February 17, 1972.  http:// 
history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1973_DoD_AR.pdf?ve
r=2014-06-24-150625-420. 
 
---.  “The Third Offset Strategy”.  YouTube video.  27:59.  Deputy Secretary Defense 
Robert Work speaks to the Air Command and Staff College about The Third 
Offset Strategy.  Posted by the Department of Defense.  May 27, 2016.  https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=wA0epN0L1fc. 
 
---.  “What is Better Buying Power?”.  Accessed February 12, 2017.  http://bbp.dau.mil/. 
 
 106 
U.S. Government.  “Long Range Research and Development Plan (LRRDP) Request for 
Information”.  The Wall Street Journal.  December 3, 2014.  http://online.wsj.com 
/public/resources/documents/offsetrfi1203.pdf. 
 
Warren ICBM and Heritage Museum.  “Atlas (SM-65)”.  http://www.warrenmuseum. 
com/missiles/atlas-sm-65/. 
 
Wilson, John.  Maneuver and Firepower:  The Evolution of Divisions and Separate 
Brigades.  Washington, DC:  Center for Military History, United States Army, 
1998.  http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/060/60-14-1/cmhPub_60-14-
1.pdf.  239-281. 
 
White House.  National Security Strategy.  February 2015.  http://nssarchive.us/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf. 
 
Work, Robert.  “Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Work on the Third Offset 
Strategy:  As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Work, Brussels 
Belgium”.  United States Department of Defense.  April 28, 2016.  https://www. 
defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/753482/remarks-by-deputy-
secretary-work-on-third-offset-strategy.     
 
“World’s Population Increasingly Urban with More Than Half Living in Urban Areas”.  
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.  July 10, 2014.  
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-
prospects-2014.html. 
